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 Taxing New Financial Products: A
 Conceptual Framework
 Jeff Strnad*
 A recent wave of innovation in the financial markets has raised difficult tax
 policy questions. Professor Strnad describes several frameworks for designing
 tax rules for new financial products and shows that two types of existing ap-
 proaches, bifurcation and integration, can create tax systems that are univer-
 sal, meaning that the system assigns a tax treatment to every transaction, and
 consistent, meaning that changing the form of the transaction will not affect
 that treatment. In particular, Professor Strnad shows that the spanning
 method, a particular bifurcation approach, can create a consistent and univer-
 sal tax system if the system is also linear. Constraints created by the current
 tax system's treatment of certain types of assets, however, prevent the spanning
 method from providing a practical solution to the problems posed by the taxa-
 tion of new financial products. Professor Strnad also shows that integration
 schemes can provide universal and consistent tax systems, even if those sys-
 tems are nonlinear. Still, discontinuities in the current tax law limit the ability
 of integration schemes to solve all of the problems created byfinancial innova-
 tion. As a result, Professor Strnad concludes that, in the absence of a major
 congressional overhaul of the tax laws, policymakers should prescribe tax
 rules for new financial products on a case by case basis.
 INTRODUCTION
 The past two decades have witnessed the advent of financial engineering as
 investment bankers, lawyers, and other specialists have created innovative and
 sometimes complex financial instruments that allow investors and issuers to
 hedge risks, to speculate, and to achieve desirable tax results. The monetary
 volume of these new instruments is staggering.I
 ? Jeff Strnad, 1994.
 * John B. Milliken Professor of Taxation, University of Southern California, and Professor of
 Law and Economics, California Institute of Technology. I am grateful for valuable comments from
 participants in the Harvard Tax Policy Workshop, participants in the Southern California Tax Policy
 Group, and, outside the workshop context, from Don Brown, Tom Griffith, Henry Hu, Louis Kaplow,
 Bill Klein, Mike Knoll, Ed McCaffery, Roberta Romano, Ted Sims, and Al Warren. All errors are my
 own responsibility.
 1. For several major categories of new financial assets, the aggregate amount of all outstanding
 notional principal contracts is in the trillions of dollars. Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Prod-
 ucts: Financial Innovation's Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1319, 1320 (1991).
 The total notional amount for "swaps," a set of recently developed instruments, exceeds the combined
 value of all shares listed on the New York and Tokyo stock exchanges. Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood
 Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102
 YALE L.J. 1457, 1548-60 (1993) (Review Essay) (citing William Glasgall & Bill Javetski, Swap Fever:
 569
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 Financial innovation poses a deep challenge for tax policy. The current
 United States tax system is based on a system of "tax cubbyholes," a few ideal-
 ized transactions for which the system specifies an exact tax treatment.2 Since
 any given new financial product is unlikely to fit squarely into a particular
 cubbyhole, the appropriate tax treatment for such products is often unclear.
 Tax indeterminacy of this type has fostered extensive debate and numerous
 proposals concerning one new financial product, contingent debt.3 Traditional
 debt consists of an obligation specifying fixed interest and principal payments.
 Contingent debt, on the other hand, combines fixed payments with payments
 that depend on uncertain future events, such as the level of a commodity price
 or equity index.
 The proposals put forward for taxing contingent debt reflect four theoretical
 approaches for taxing new financial products: bifurcation, integration, local
 pattern taxation, and global pattern taxation.4 "Bifurcation" decomposes a new
 Big Money, Big Risks, Bus. WK., June 1, 1992, at 102). The measurement of volume is in notional
 amounts because many new instruments are derivatives with payouts that depend on the returns to a
 fixed amount of some other security or securities. See Hu, supra, at 1459 n.6, 1467 n.44. The fixed
 amount is the notional amount. For example, an instrument might pay an amount equal to the interest
 payments on $10,000,000 of a particular kind of floating rate debt.
 It is not only the sheer volume of individual new instruments that is impressive. Financial innova-
 tors are introducing new instruments at unparalleled rates, and these instruments often reach large
 volumes after a very steep exponential increase. See id. at 1459.
 2. See Richard Briffett, Avoiding New Evils by Applying New Remedies: Taxes and the Cross-
 Border Transaction, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1992, at 109, 109-10; Kleinbard, supra note 1, at
 1320. Classification of new financial products in the face of rapid innovation is a problem for financial
 regulation and corporate law as well as tax law. In fact, the cubbyhole description put forward by both
 Briffett and Kleinbard had its origin in work by Henry Hu that focuses largely on these other fields of
 law. See Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modem Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a
 Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 333, 335-39, 392-412 (1989) [hereinafter Hu, Regulatory
 Paradigm] (discussing the adaptation of international bank regulation to the proliferation of new finan-
 cial products); Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modem Process of Financial Innovation,
 and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1273, 1292-1300, 1311-12 (1991) [hereinafter
 Hu, Shareholder Welfare] (discussing problems of new security classification in the corporate law con-
 text); Briffett, supra, at 110 n.6; Kleinbard, supra note 1, at 1353 n.101.
 3. See, e.g., David P. Hariton, New Rules Bifurcating Contingent Debt-A Mistake?, 51 TAX
 NoTEs 235, 235-39 (1991) [hereinafter Hariton, New Rules] (questioning the bifurcation approach ad-
 vocated in the 1991 Proposed Regulations due to its inability to handle contingent debt instruments);
 David P. Hariton, More on Bifurcation of Contingent Debt, 51 TAX NoTEs 1075, 1075-76 (1991) (chal-
 lenging the practicality of the bifurcation approach); Randall K.C. Kau, Carving Up Assets and Liabili-
 ties-Integration or Bifurcation of Financial Products, 63 TAXES 1003, 1007-10 (1990) (proposing an
 integration approach to minimize mismatching of timing, source, and character); Edward D. Kleinbard,
 Beyond Good and Evil Debt (And Debt Hedges): A Cost of Capital Allowance System, 67 TAXES 943,
 943-61 (1989) (discounting the integration argument and other approaches in favor of a capital cost
 allowance system); Lawrence Lokken, New Rules Bifurcating Contingent Debt-A Good Start, 51 TAX
 NoTEs 495, 495-504 (1991) (countering Hariton's criticisms of the bifurcation approach but admitting
 that bifurcation remains an imperfect solution); Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, Report
 on Amendments to Proposed Regulation Section 1.1275-4: Proposed Regulations Regarding Certain
 Contingent Debt Instruments Under the Original Issue Discount Rules, 53 TAX NOTES 1187, 1187-1204
 (1991) [hereinafter ABA Report] (recommending simplifying rules even if at the expense of some
 coherence).
 4. Indeed, the participants in the debate about the proper treatment of contingent debt apply their
 analyses directly to other financial instruments. See, e.g., Kleinbard, supra note 1, at 1327-68 (discuss-
 ing the appropriate tax treatment for various equity swaps and other derivatives); David P. Hariton,
 Equity Swaps, New Regulations, and Ed Kleinbard's Article, 52 TAX NoTEs 1221, 1221-24 (1991)
 (critiquing Kleinbard's integration argument in favor of a more rule-intensive approach).
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 financial product into a collection of component instruments, each with a
 known tax treatment.5 The 1991 version of the Proposed Treasury Regulations
 for contingent debt apply this approach.6 Operationally, these Regulations call
 for dividing the instrument into a noncontingent portion and a contingent por-
 tion by subtracting the present value of the noncontingent payments from the
 issue price of the instrument. The noncontingent portion, consisting of fixed
 payments and their present value, is subject to the usual taxation rules for ordi-
 nary debt instruments. The remaining contingent part of the instrument "will
 have the economic characteristics of one or more options or other property
 rights [which] ... can be taxed as they would be taxed if issued separately."7
 Thus, it may be necessary to divide the contingent part itself into separate
 pieces, each having a known and distinct tax treatment.
 "Integration," the logical complement of bifurcation, pools financial instru-
 ments together rather than splitting them apart. The resulting aggregate cash
 flow is taxed according to its "predominant characteristic."8 For example, sev-
 eral commentators suggest that where a taxpayer fully hedges the contingent
 portion of contingent debt, tax policy should combine the hedge position with
 the contingent debt and treat the consequent riskless cash flow as ordinary
 debt.9
 "Local pattern taxation" applies a single generic treatment to all new finan-
 cial products. This generic treatment includes rules for timing, characteriza-
 tion, and source of cash flow. The term "local" emphasizes the fact that the
 generic treatment applies only to new financial products. The tax treatment of
 5. Although bifurcation suggests division into two pieces, the literature uses the word to describe
 the decomposition of a financial instrument into two or more pieces. I follow that convention in this
 article.
 6. Prop. Treas. Reg. ? 1.1275-4(g), 56 Fed. Reg. 8303 (1991). The Treasury issued a later version
 of the Proposed Regulations for contingent debt on January 19, 1993, but then withdrew it along with
 other unpublished regulations on January 25, 1993, to allow reconsideration by incoming Clinton ad-
 ministration officials. The 1993 version abandons the bifurcation approach taken in the 1991 version.
 For a discussion of the 1993 version, see David C. Garlock, A Primer on the New Proposed (Almost)
 Regulations for Contingent Debt Instruments, 58 TAX NoTEs 1225 (1993); David P. Hariton, Contingent
 Debt: Putting the Pieces Together, 58 TAx NoTEs 1231 (1993).
 7. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking FI-189-84, 1991-1 C.B. 834, 835. The pertinent text of the
 Proposed Regulation calls for treating the contingent payments "in accordance with their economic
 substance as payments pursuant to one or more options or other property rights." Prop. Treas. Reg.
 ? 1.1275-4(g)(4)(i), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308 (1991). Neither the explanation nor the text of the Proposed
 Regulation specify a method for choosing one particular decomposition of the contingent payments into
 other assets. More than one such decomposition may be possible.
 8. Kau, supra note 3, at 1007-10.
 9. See, e.g., Kleinbard, supra note 3, at 953; ABA Report, supra note 3, at 1199-1200. To see how
 hedging works, consider the following example. A company issues gold bonds that feature a payment
 that is tied to the price of gold on the date that the bond matures. The company also buys gold futures.
 Purchasing these futures in the right amount provides an exact offset against changes in liabilities on the
 bonds caused by fluctuations in the spot price of gold. An increase in gold prices would result in a
 heavier obligation under the bonds and in equal and offsetting gains on the gold futures positions.
 The company might engage in this type of hedging to achieve a lower cost of capital, as issuing
 gold bonds may be a cheap way to borrow money given inefficiencies in other segments of the capital
 market. This type of motivation appears to be very important in the real world. For example, the
 exploitation of capital market and regulatory inefficiencies is central to the classic arbitrage explanation
 for the growth of the multitrillion dollar market in swaps. See Hu, Regulatory Paradigm, supra note 2,
 at 350-53, 365.
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 preexisting financial instruments may deviate sharply from that generic treat-
 ment. Local pattern taxation may be combined with bifurcation and integra-
 tion. For example, a recent American Bar Association report advocates
 bifurcating contingent debt into contingent and noncontingent portions but then
 taxing the contingent portion as a single unit under a set of generic rules.10
 "Global pattern taxation" applies a single generic treatment to all instru-
 ments. This approach directly responds to the idea that the current variety of
 distinct tax treatments for different investments makes it especially difficult to
 prescribe tax rules for new financial products. For example, although equity
 investments with no current cash flows avoid taxation until realization occurs,
 interest is accrued and taxed on zero coupon bonds under the Original Issue
 Discount (OID) rules even though there is no cash flow from such bonds until
 maturity. When an instrument combines the features of a zero coupon bond
 and an equity investment that pays no dividends, 1I it is unclear whether income
 should be accrued and taxed or deferred until realization. Global pattern taxa-
 tion would obviate such dilemmas by imposing a single consistent method
 (such as cash flow taxation or accretion taxation) to all instruments, including
 new financial products.
 Assessing the relative merits of these disparate approaches requires a
 framework by which to compare them. The development of such a framework
 is one of the main purposes of this article. The analysis that follows relies
 heavily on two distinct desiderata for a good tax system: universality and con-
 sistency. Two variants of the consistency principle, linearity and continuity,
 also play an important role.
 Universality requires that the tax system specify a tax treatment for every
 possible transaction. This principle is attractive both as an administrative goal
 and as an ideal in a system faced with financial innovation. If the tax treatment
 of particular portfolios of cash flow patterns is unclear, taxpayers and the gov-
 ernment will face heightened administrative costs. The government will need
 to specify rules for ambiguous situations, and, prior to the development of such
 10. See ABA Report, supra note 3, at 1195-1201. The report uses a "cost recovery rule" for
 timing, requiring that basis be recovered before any gain is recognized. Gain would be ordinary or
 capital depending on whether the transaction is part of the ordinary course of business or is an invest-
 ment activity. The report does not specify sourcing rules but strongly urges the development of a uni-
 form set of such rules. Id. at 1200.
 A similar example is the "expected value taxation" system suggested by Professor Reed Shuldiner.
 Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 TEX. L. REv. 243,
 283-89 (1992). Under this system, one would decompose each asset into a noncontingent portion con-
 sisting of all expected cash flows and a residual contingent portion. An approach similar to the OID
 rules would determine the tax for the noncontingent portion, with income accruing based on the increase
 in present value as future expected cash flows draw near. A realization approach would apply to the
 residual contingent portion, with no tax until the time when risk is resolved and final cash flows materi-
 alize. Id. at 285.
 11. For example, a debt instrument might consist of the right to receive $1000 plus the level of the
 S&P 500 index times $1 in 10 years. The $1000 payment is fixed. Without the index component, the
 instrument would be a zero coupon bond. But the right to receive a payment contingent on the future
 value of the S&P 500 index is an equity interest equivalent to buying a stock that does not pay dividends
 and then selling the stock at a specified future time.
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 rules, taxpayers will be unable to predict the tax consequences of holding par-
 ticular instruments or portfolios.
 Even if a tax system is universal, financial innovation poses another set of
 potential problems. Innovative packaging of a set of cash flows may result in a
 tax that differs from the tax that would be due if the cash flows were packaged
 in a more traditional manner. In a tax system where the same pattern of cash
 flows may have different tax consequences depending on the form chosen for
 transactions or portfolios, taxpayers will expend resources searching for the
 most advantageous form. At the same time, the government will be concerned
 that many tax treatments will become "elective" for taxpayers who can change
 these treatments by recasting their transactions or portfolios. Thus, even if the
 tax system is universal, substantial administrative costs may result if arrange-
 ments that are equivalent financially do not have the same tax consequences.
 This problem motivates the idea of consistency. A tax system is consistent
 if and only if every cash flow pattern has a unique tax treatment. In such a
 system, it is not possible to manipulate tax outcomes by repackaging cash flows
 into different financial vehicles.12
 Consistency is an important objective not only because of the administra-
 tive costs caused by its absence but also because of its close connection with
 "tax arbitrage." Tax arbitrage arises in its purest form when a series of transac-
 tions results in no net cash flow but provides tax advantages. Suppose, for
 example, that two portfolios result in the same cash flows but that one portfolio
 produces capital gains and losses while the second portfolio produces ordinary
 gains and losses. Assuming both portfolios are likely to produce gains, an in-
 vestor can make money at government expense (with high probability) by
 matching a long position in the first portfolio with a short position in the sec-
 ond. The long position results in capital gain while the short position creates an
 equal amount of ordinary loss. The combined net cash flow from the two posi-
 tions is zero. "Conversion" of ordinary income into capital gain occurs because
 ordinary income is offset by the ordinary loss generated by the short position
 and replaced by the capital gain from the long position. If the tax rate for
 capital gain is lower than the rate for ordinary income, the taxpayer receives a
 tax reduction without making any net investment.
 This series of transactions violates consistency because it is equivalent, in
 cash flow terms, to doing nothing, and the usual result for a taxpayer who does
 not engage in any transactions is that there are no tax consequences. In a con-
 sistent tax system, tax arbitrage is not possible. Since tax arbitrage tends to
 defeat distinctions set up in the tax laws, such as the distinction between capital
 gain and ordinary income, and tends to produce free money at government
 expense for well-capitalized taxpayers, the usual presumption is that tax arbi-
 trage is an evil to be controlled. This view provides a normative basis for
 12. Even commentators who believe that the consistency goal is unattainable still see it as norma-
 tively appealing. See, e.g., Hariton, supra note 4, at 1224; Kau, supra note 3, at 1004.
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 requiring consistency that goes beyond the goal of reducing administrative
 costs by making tax treatments determinate and unmanipulable.13
 Bifurcation approaches appear capable of promoting the goal of consistency
 because they impose a tax on the income from each instrument equal to the sum
 of the taxes on the income from the components that make up the instrument.
 However, commentators have been extremely skeptical about the possibility of
 implementing operationally coherent bifurcation approaches. There are many
 ways to divide an instrument into pieces with known tax treatments, and differ-
 ent methods of division may result in different tax treatments.14
 Integration methods suffer from similar ambiguities. There is more than
 one way to aggregate sets of instruments into groups, and the overall tax results
 may depend on the particular choice of groupings. In addition, the proper way
 to characterize a particular aggregate of instruments may not be clear in a sys-
 tem replete with distinct and sometimes contradictory tax approaches.15
 Local pattern taxation also entails potential consistency problems. New fi-
 nancial instruments may generate cash flows arbitrarily close to those of a pre-
 existing instrument with a known tax treatment. Unless this tax treatment
 happens to correspond to the generic treatment for new financial products, in-
 struments with nearly identical cash flows may incur very different tax
 liabilities.
 Global pattern taxation is the only one of the four general approaches that
 can achieve consistency and universality without an obvious operational or
 conceptual flaw. But because implementation of global pattern taxation would
 require systemic reform, this fact is of little comfort to administrators who must
 craft rules in a system arrayed with different tax treatments that must be taken
 as given.
 The problems with these four approaches have fostered significant frustra-
 tion in the tax reform literature. Even prominent commentators who have de-
 veloped and critiqued elaborate technical approaches have resigned themselves
 to relying on reform measures such as "common law development" or an ongo-
 ing dialogue between the Treasury Department and tax practitioners.16
 Despite these bleak assessments, aspects of the theory of financial econom-
 ics suggest that certain bifurcation and integration approaches are workable so-
 lutions. In particular, the literature on "spanning" provides an "atomic theory"
 of finance, in which it is possible to replicate the exact cash flow of any asset or
 portfolio by a unique combination of the elements from a specified set of as-
 13. Tax arbitrage can serve positive social goals by inducing price changes that are socially desira-
 ble. These price changes largely or entirely offset the tax advantages of the arbitrage itself. See, e.g.,
 Alan J. Auerbach, Should Interest Deductions Be Limited?, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A
 HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 195 (Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Galper & Joseph A. Pechman eds.,
 1988) (noting that tax arbitrage from leveraged holdings of tax-exempt securities may lower the price of
 borrowing for state and local governments).
 14. Most commentators find this characteristic to be fatal. See, e.g., Hariton, New Rules, supra
 note 3, at 237; Kau, supra note 3, at 1004; ABA Report, supra note 3, at 1194-95.
 15. See, e.g., Hariton, supra note 4, at 1222; ABA Report, supra note 3, at 1195.
 16. See, e.g., Hariton, supra note 4, at 1224 (advocating an ongoing dialogue); Lokken, supra note
 3, at 504 (suggesting the common law approach).
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 sets.17 The specified set of assets thus "spans" the universe of possible finan-
 cial assets and is therefore called a "spanning set."
 The possibility of spanning the entire economy with a fundamental set of
 assets raises the intriguing possibility that the tax law might simply specify the
 taxation of assets in the spanning set. To ascertain the tax treatment of any
 asset not in that set, including any new financial product, one would determine
 the unique decomposition of the asset into a weighted sum of spanning set
 assets and then add up the taxes for that weighted sum. This bifurcation ap-
 proach would guarantee that the tax system is consistent and universal.18
 Given the apparent simplicity of this method, one might ask whether it
 could work in a tax system where radically different approaches govern the tax
 treatment of particular transactions. For example, would the approach work if
 some transactions are subject to accretion taxation while others are subject to
 cash flow taxation? If the approach did work, it might be possible to retain
 some or all of the "tax cubbyholes" in current law while simultaneously taxing
 new financial instruments in a consistent manner.
 Part I examines this question by studying the "spanning method," a bifurca-
 tion approach similar to the one just outlined. Using the spanning method, it is
 possible to specify some cubbyhole tax treatments arbitrarily, and yet still con-
 struct a set of bifurcation rules that result in a consistent and universal tax
 system. However, the spanning method can succeed in achieving consistency
 and universality only for some configurations of cubbyholes, and only if these
 cubbyholes are precisely defined. Short of fundamental reform, the present
 cubbyhole structure in the United States tax system precludes the successful
 use of the method.
 The main task of Part II is to develop a logical taxonomy of theoretical
 approaches for taxing new financial products and then to relate this taxonomy
 to practical approaches such as bifurcation and integration. Part II begins by
 probing the relationship between the spanning method and the set of all consis-
 tent and universal tax systems. The first major result is that for every consis-
 tent and universal tax system, there is an integration approach that can
 implement that system. In contrast, not every consistent and universal tax sys-
 tem reduces to the spanning method. This result highlights the fact that the
 categories of integration, bifurcation, and local pattern taxation are not mutu-
 ally exclusive. The set of successful bifurcation and local pattern approaches is
 a subset of the set of successful integration methods.
 Developing the taxonomy of theoretical approaches and clarifying the rela-
 tionships between them requires the use of two refinements of consistency,
 17. See, e.g., D.J. Brown, C.D. Huijsmans & B. de Pagter, Approximating Derivative Securities in
 f-Algebras, in PoSrrIVE OPERATORS, RIEsz SPACES, AND ECONOMICS 171 (Charalambos D. Aliprantis,
 Kim C. Border & Wilhelmus A.J. Luxemburg eds., 1992); Donald J. Brown & Stephen A. Ross, Span-
 ning, Valuation and Options, 1 ECON. THEORY 3 (1991); Stephen A. Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90
 Q.J. ECON. 75 (1976).
 18. Some integration approaches also would work. In fact, whenever there is a bifurcation ap-
 proach that is consistent, there is also a consistent integration approach. However, the converse is not
 true. See text accompanying notes 68-74 infra.
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 "linearity" and "continuity."19 A tax system is linear when the tax on any
 transaction equals the sum of the taxes on any collection of subtransactions that
 comprise that transaction. Part II shows that a tax system is linear and univer-
 sal if and only if it reduces to the spanning method. Thus, the spanning method
 is not just one particular kind of bifurcation but is the paradigmatic treatment
 for any linear tax system.
 In nonlinear tax systems-such as the current system in the United States
 the concept of continuity is important. Continuity exists when portfolios that
 are nearly identical have nearly identical tax outcomes. Continuity is a stronger
 condition than consistency but weaker than linearity. Thus, linear systems are a
 subset of continuous systems, which, in turn, are a subset of consistent systems.
 Part II shows that precisely the same goals that make consistency desirable,
 such as obviating problems of tax arbitrage, also make continuity desirable. In
 addition, because the current United States tax system has significant non-
 linearities, certain continuous and universal integration approaches are the
 strongest candidates for dealing with new financial products. Unfortunately,
 despite the strength of these integration approaches compared to the spanning
 method, none are immediately applicable to the current United States tax sys-
 tem. Fundamental reform would have to precede their successful application.
 Part III discusses the application and tax policy implications of the frame-
 work developed in Part II. The framework transcends the new financial prod-
 ucts area. Bifurcation and integration techniques exist in many other areas of
 tax law. In addition, inconsistencies, discontinuities, and nonlinearities in cur-
 rent law provide focal points for tax-motivated financial innnovation. The
 existence and fundamental nature of many of these inconsistencies, discontinui-
 ties, and nonlinearities means that, without systemic reform, crafting rules for
 taxing new financial products requires difficult, "second best" choices. Conse-
 quently, this article adds to the skepticism in the literature about bifurcation,
 integration, and local pattern approaches.20 Nonetheless, the conceptual frame-
 work developed here clarifies the available approaches to taxing new financial
 products and may inform the ongoing debate about whether and how to insti-
 tute such reform.
 I. THE SPANNING METHOD
 Spanning studies from the finance literature provide a starting point for dis-
 cussing necessary and sufficient conditions for tax systems to be consistent and
 universal. The spanning literature ranges from straightforward early work by
 19. Consistency, continuity, linearity, and universality are ideals of operational coherence for the
 tax system. However, this set of ideals is not comprehensive. There may be situations where it is
 desirable to sacrifice operational coherence for other goals such as economic efficiency or distributional
 equity.
 Nonetheless, because coherence is a significant concern for both taxpayers and administrators, the
 tax structure implications of different operational coherence norms are important. Moreover, knowledge
 of the circumstances under which these norms are not fully attainable is valuable for courts, administra-
 tors, and legislatures, who must balance competing goals in designing and implementing tax rules.
 20. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
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 Professor Stephen Ross21 to recent advanced mathematical analysis.22 As men-
 tioned above,23 the spanning approach views any financial instrument as reduc-
 ible to a combination of assets from a specified collection called the spanning
 set. Under the spanning method, the tax on the income from an instrument is
 set equal to the sum of the taxes on the income from the spanning set assets that
 comprise the instrument.
 In order to clarify the results from the spanning literature and to apply them
 to the taxation of new financial products, this Part proceeds in four sections.
 First, section A illustrates the spanning method by developing a simple exam-
 ple consisting of an economy with three financial assets. Section B employs
 this example to show that the spanning method can be used to construct a con-
 sistent and universal system even under the constraint that particular existing
 assets must be taxed in radically different ways. Section C shows that, despite
 this positive result, consistency becomes unattainable when the system is over-
 constrained-that is, when the system has too many assets with predetermined
 tax treatments. In addition, even when the tax system can accommodate a par-
 ticular set of disparate tax treatments, consistency may require a considerable
 sacrifice in terms of "tax aesthetics." The treatment of some transactions will
 conflict with most major conceptions of how such transactions should be taxed.
 Finally, section D provides some policy perspectives on these problems, argu-
 ing that implementation of the spanning method remains infeasible absent fun-
 damental reform of the current system.
 A. Spanning in a Simple Economy
 Consider an economy that lasts only two 1-year periods.24 Within this
 economy there are three financial assets. Two of the assets are zero coupon
 bonds. One bond initially costs $100 (at "time zero") and yields $110 at the
 end of year one. The other bond costs $100 at time zero and yields $121 at the
 end of year two. Thus, interest rates are 10 percent per year for both years in
 the model.
 The final asset is a "stock," representing the right to collect a particular cash
 flow at the end of year two. The amount of the cash flow is uncertain but will
 take one of five possible values: $121, $242, $363, $484, or $605. Each of the
 five outcomes is equally likely, and no further information is available about
 the likelihood of any outcome until the end of the two years. Consequently, the
 stock's expected final value is $363.25 Assuming that investors are risk neu-
 21. See Ross, supra note 17.
 22. See Brown et al., supra note 17; Brown & Ross, supra note 17.
 23. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
 24. Two periods are the minimum needed to distinguish between cash flow and accretion treat-
 ment. The difference is that cash flow treatment allows deferral of the tax on gains until realization.
 Consequently, if there is only a single period in which all cash flows occur, accretion and cash flow
 taxation will be identical.
 25. $363 is simply the average final value of the stock. Each of the five outcomes occurs with a
 probability of one-fifth, so that the average is $363 = (($121+$242+$363+$484+$605)/5).
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 tral,26 this $363 has a present value of $300 at time zero, which is therefore the
 price of the stock at that time. Furthermore, the stock will appreciate to $330 at
 the end of the first year.27
 Finally, it is also convenient to assume that the five stock outcomes corre-
 spond to the five possible "states of the world." In other words, only five fu-
 ture environments are possible, and any "risky" endeavor is risky only because
 its outcome differs depending on which environment emerges.
 Attaining a consistent and universal tax system using the spanning method
 requires the construction (or existence) of assets that "complete the market." In
 economics terminology, a securities market is complete if, for each state of the
 world, there is a portfolio that yields a positive amount in that state and zero in
 all others.28 Each such portfolio provides insurance against a particular state
 occurring.29 When portfolios consist solely of combinations of the stock and
 the two bonds, it is impossible to construct an insurance portfolio for each state.
 Indeed, the only asset with varying returns is the stock, and it has positive
 returns in all five states. Completing the market, if it is possible at all, requires
 the creation of additional assets.
 A central conclusion of the spanning literature is that completing the market
 is possible if and only if there is some asset or portfolio that has distinct returns
 in each potential state of the world.30 In that case, the ability to create call
 26. The assumption that investors are risk averse does not materially affect any of the results that
 follow. The results depend only on the ability to replicate any possible cash flow pattern with some
 combination of assets from a spanning set. This ability is a function of the set of assets available, not of
 the degree of risk aversion of the populace.
 27. Since investors are risk neutral, they will use the riskless rate of 10% to discount expected
 cash flows to present value. Each risky asset will increase at a 10% rate until the end of year two, when
 uncertainty about the risky outcomes in the economy is resolved. Thus, during the first year the stock's
 price will increase by $30 over its initial value of $300.
 28. The existence of complete markets simplifies the task of designing a tax system that is consis-
 tent and universal because the spanning method only works if markets are complete or can be made
 complete. The spanning method is important since, as Part II shows, a broad class of other approaches
 that guarantee consistency and universality reduce to that method. See text accompanying notes 69-77
 infra. However, the existence of complete markets is not a sufficient condition for consistency and
 universality. These properties can only be jointly present if the tax system has a certain degree of
 coherence. This article shows that, absent comprehensive reform, the current tax system lacks that
 degree of coherence.
 If the tax system were sufficiently coherent, it would be important to consider the possibility that
 markets are incomplete. Given incomplete markets, the universality condition could be relaxed by re-
 quiring a specified tax treatment only for every attainable cash flow combination. It would not be
 necessary to specify tax treatments for any "missing" financial instruments corresponding to cash flow
 outcomes that are not attainable. The tax authorities would never face the need to know how to tax these
 instruments since these instruments by definition would not exist.
 29. The amount paid for an asset with a positive return in one state and zero in all others is
 equivalent to an insurance premium. The positive yield on that asset if the particular state occurs corre-
 sponds to the payment of an insurance claim when an insured event happens.
 If all states are insurable, it is easy to see why markets are called complete: An individual can
 protect against any contingency that might occur. Since the ability to pass risks on to those most willing
 to bear them is an important economic mission for capital markets, completeness is a desirable property.
 30. Professor Ross proved this result in a 2-period world with a finite number of states similar to
 the one postulated here. See Ross, supra note 17, at 84-86. Others have since proven similar results
 using models with a continuum of states of the world and multiple periods. See Brown & Ross, supra
 note 17 (continuum of states); Fran,ois R. Velde, Essays in the Theory and History of Optimal Fiscal
 Policy, 66-70 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, on file with the Stanford Law
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 options on that asset or portfolio ensures a complete market. A call option
 consists of the right, but not the obligation, to buy a particular asset at a
 prespecified price, known as "exercise price" or "strike price."'31
 The basic idea behind this complete market result is simple: By creating
 call options, it is possible to divide an asset with distinct returns in every state
 (such as the stock in this case) into a series of insurance portfolios that yield a
 positive return in one state and zero in all other states.32 This series of insur-
 ance assets is a "spanning set" since any portfolio or asset is equivalent to a
 unique combination of insurance assets.
 Working out an example based on the 5-state economy described above
 helps to demonstrate this method of completing the market. As a first step, it is
 convenient to label the states by reference to the stock returns:
 TABLE I: STATES AND STOCK OUTCOMES
 State Stock Outcome
 A $121
 B $242
 C $363
 D $484
 E $605
 Next, consider call options on the stock that the holder can only exercise when
 they expire at the end of year two.33 The value of each such call option at that
 time will be equal to the difference between the price of the underlying stock
 and the contractually specified strike price, if that difference is positive. Other-
 wise, the option will be worthless.34
 Review) (multiperiod model with continuum of states). These more general results require using Riesz
 spaces, an advanced mathematical tool.
 The analysis in this article is limited to a much-simplified framework of a 5-state, 2-period econ-
 omy. A more complex model would yield results substantially similar to those obtained here, and the
 added mathematical complexity would not add significantly to the intuitive understanding available
 from the simple model.
 31. An option is a contract between two parties. The buyer (also called the holder) of a call option
 has the right to buy a particular asset, such as a stock, at a particular price specified in the contract. The
 seller (also called the writer) of the call option agrees to sell the specified asset at the specified price to
 the holder of the option if the holder exercises the option.
 32. Alternatively, one can ensure complete markets by using only puts on the asset or portfolio.
 See Ross, supra note 17, at 82. A put consists of the right to sell an asset at a particular price. Both puts
 and calls are necessary to complete a market in cases where the exercise prices of all options are re-
 stricted to be positive. Id. at 84.
 33. Call options that can only be exercised on the expiration date are called "European" call
 options. In contrast, the holder of an "American" call option can exercise the option at any time be-
 tween the date the option is written and the expiration date. European options suffice in the example
 developed here because all risk in the economy is resolved at the end of year two. Options exercisable
 only at that time will account for all the possible risky outcomes.
 34. Suppose that the strike price of a European call option is $X. If the price of the stock is
 $(X+Y) at the time of expiration and Y is greater than zero, then the option holder will exercise the
 option since the option will be worth $Y at the time of expiration. Conversely, if Y is negative at the
 time of expiration (meaning that the stock price is below $X), then the holder will not exercise the
 option. In that case, the option is worthless and expires. For a more in-depth introduction to options,
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 From this set of call options, one can create insurance portfolios that yield
 positive returns in one state but zero in all other states. This task is easy for
 state E. A call option on the stock with an exercise price of $484 will be worth
 $121 if state E occurs and zero if any other state occurs.35
 Creating insurance portfolios for states A, B, C, and D requires combining
 call options with differing strike prices. For convenience, denote a call option
 with a strike price of $X as C(X) and denote the stock as S. The following
 table shows various options and their payoffs in each state:
 TABLE II: OPrION PAYOFFS IN VARIOUS STATES
 Option
 State C(484) C(363) C(242) C(121) S = C(0)
 A $0 $0 $0 $0 $121
 B $0 $0 $0 $121 $242
 C $0 $0 $121 $242 $363
 D $0 $121 $242 $363 $484
 E $121 $242 $363 $484 $605
 As indicated in the table, the stock is equivalent to an option with an exercise
 price of zero. Denoting an insurance portfolio that yields $1 in state Z and
 nothing in any other state as P(Z), the following equations represent the combi-
 nations of the stock and call options on the stock that generate an insurance
 portfolio for each state:36
 P(A) = (1/121) x [S - (2 x C(121)) + C(242)]
 P(B) = (1/121) x [C(121) - (2 x C(242)) + C(363)]
 P(C) = (1/121) x [C(242) - (2 x C(363)) + C(484)]
 see RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 483-534 (4th ed.
 1991).
 35. This option gives the holder the right to buy the stock for $484 at the end of year two. If states
 A, B, C, or D occur, the holder will not exercise the option since the stock will be worth at most $484.
 However, if state E occurs, the price of the stock will be $605, and the option will be worth $121 ($605-
 $484).
 Actually, any call option with an exercise price that is greater than or equal to $484 but less than
 $605 would suffice for insuring state E. An exercise price of $484 merely aids in the exposition of the
 example.
 36. It is easy to verify these relations. For example, to verify the relation for P(B), consider the
 following table of payoffs:
 TABLE OF PAYOFFS
 Aggregate Payoff
 (sum of the
 State C(121) -2 x C(242) C(363) previous three columns)
 A $0 $0 $0 $0
 B $121 $0 $0 $121
 C $242 -$242 $0 $0
 D $363 -$484 $121 $0
 E $484 -$726 $242 $0
 As the table indicates, combining one long position in each of C(121) and C(363) with two short posi-
 tions in C(242) results in a portfolio that pays $121 in state B and zero in all other states. Dividing this
 portfolio by 121 yields P(B), paying $1 in state B and nothing in any other state.
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 P(D) = (1/121) x [C(363) - (2 x C(484))]
 P(E) = (1/121) x [C(484)]
 Negative signs in front of call options denote the sale, rather than the purchase,
 of those options. Hence, appropriate long and short combinations of the stock
 and the five specified call options on the stock create insurance portfolios for
 each possible state. As a result, creation of the options completes the market in
 this example.
 One can fully describe any asset with payoffs at the end of year two simply
 by specifying its payoffs in each of the five states. Therefore, any such asset is
 a combination of the five portfolios in the set [P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)].
 For example, consider an asset that pays $2 in state B, $5 in state D, and noth-
 ing in the other three states. This asset is equivalent to a portfolio consisting of
 two P(B)s and five P(D)s. Moreover, because the P(Z)s represent combinations
 of C(X)s, one can also describe the asset as a combination of the five underly-
 ing options in the set [C(0), C(121), C(242), C(363), C(484)]. Thus, any asset
 with payoffs at the end of year two is equivalent to some combination of these
 five basic options.
 It is also true that any asset from either the set [P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D),
 P(E)] or the set [C(0), C(121), C(242), C(363), C(484)] will replicate the 1-
 year payoff of any other asset or portfolio in the economy. In the model, all
 economic risk is resolved at the end of year two. Since investors are risk neu-
 tral, the value of all assets in the economy, including the stock, the bonds, and
 the options, will increase at the riskless rate of 10 percent per year during the
 first year. Thus, any of the assets in the two sets will replicate the returns on
 the zero coupon bond which pays $110 at the end of year one on an initial
 investment of $100.
 Because each of the sets [P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)] and [C(0), C(121),
 C(242), C(363), C(484)] can be used to replicate any financial asset in the
 economy, each is a spanning set. As such, each is potentially useful for con-
 structing a universal and consistent tax system. However, to ensure that the
 system specifies a unique tax outcome for each instrument, the spanning set
 cannot be "overspecified." In particular, it must be impossible to remove an
 element from the set and still have a spanning set consisting of the remaining
 elements.37 A spanning set with this property of irreducibility is called a "min-
 imal" spanning set.
 In fact, both of the above sets are irreducible. Irreducibility is obvious for
 the set [P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)]. Each of the assets represents a 2-year
 return of $1 in one of the five states of the world and zero in all of the other
 37. If it were possible to remove an asset from a spanning set and still have a spanning set, then
 that redundant asset would be equivalent to a linear combination of assets in the reduced spanning set.
 One could substitute this combination of assets for the redundant asset in any combination from the
 original spanning set used to represent a financial instrument. Thus, there would be two different repre-
 sentations for any such instrument from that spanning set. The tax treatment of the instrument would be
 ambiguous unless the redundant asset had exactly the same tax consequences as the equivalent combina-
 tion from the reduced spanning set. One may assign tax treatments arbitrarily to the assets in a minimal
 spanning set and not worry about the tax system becoming inconsistent. That freedom vanishes when
 the spanning set is not minimal.
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 states. Removing any one asset from this set makes it impossible to replicate a
 nonzero return in one of the five states at the end of year two. Slightly more
 complex reasoning establishes the irreducibility of the set [C(O), C(121),
 C(242), C(363), C(484)].38
 It is no coincidence that each of the two minimal spanning sets defined
 above contains five assets. The model assumes that five states of the world are
 possible at the end of year two. At least five distinct assets are necessary to
 capture the distinct outcomes in these five states.39
 Given the concepts just developed, it is possible to state two principles that
 are useful for designing a tax system capable of dealing with new financial
 products:
 Unique Representation Principle: In an economy with a minimal spanning set,
 any collection of cash flows has a unique representation as a combination of
 assets in that set.
 Nonunique Minimal Spanning Set Principle: If a minimal spanning set exists,
 it generally is not unique.
 38. The argument works as follows: For the set [C(O), C(121), C(242), C(363), C(484)] to be
 minimal, each element must be essential for spanning to occur. Refer to the returns in Table II, and
 consider first the problem of creating an asset that pays off only in state A. For this task, C(O) is clearly
 essential since it is the only asset with a nonzero return in state A. The next step is to show that C(O)
 may be combined with other assets so that the combination yields zero return in state B without also
 yielding zero in state A. The only asset in the set that will accomplish this task is C(121) since it is the
 only asset beside C(O) that has a nonzero return in state B. The combination C(O) - (2 x C(121)) yields a
 positive return in state A and a zero return in state B. However, this portfolio has negative returns in
 states C, D, and E. Thus, one must add at least one asset that makes the return in these three states zero
 while retaining the zero payoff in state B and a positive payoff in state A. The asset C(242) is essential
 for this task since it is the only asset besides C(O) and C(121) that has a nonzero return in state C. It
 turns out that C(O), C(121), and C(242) suffice to produce an asset with a nonzero return in state A and
 zero returns in all other states.
 To see that the remaining two assets, C(363) and C(484), are essential elements of the minimal set,
 consider designing a portfolio that pays off only in state C. Asset C(O) is the only asset with a nonzero
 return in state A. Since any portfolio including asset C(O) would yield a nonzero return in state A, C(O)
 cannot be one of the building blocks for the desired portfolio. Given that C(O) is ineligible, C(121) is
 also ineligible because it is the only other asset with returns in state B.
 The remaining three assets, C(242), C(363), and C(484) are all necessary for creating a portfolio
 with returns only in state C for the same reasons that C(O), C(121), and C(242) were necessary to
 produce a portfolio with payoffs only in state A. In particular, C(242) is necessary because it is the only
 remaining asset (after excluding C(O) and C(121)) that has nonzero returns in state C. In addition,
 C(363) is necessary to cancel out the returns from C(242) in state D, and C(484) is necessary to cancel
 the returns in state E from C(242) and C(363).
 39. Readers familiar with linear algebra will realize that the minimal spanning set in the example
 must have five elements. Because there are five states of the world, the returns in the second period
 form a five-dimensional vector space, with the return in each state representing one dimension. The
 returns from the assets in the set [P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)] constitute an orthonormal basis for this
 vector space since each asset in that set returns $1 in one distinct state and $0 in the other four states.
 Any other basis, i.e., any other irreducible set of asset returns that spans the space, must also contain five
 elements. Furthermore, the assets in any such basis must be an invertible linear transformation of the
 assets in [P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)]. As a result, the argument in note 38 supra that the set [C(O),
 C(121), C(242), C(363), C(484)] is a minimal spanning set reduces to showing that the returns from this
 set are an invertible linear transformation of the returns generated by the assets in the set [P(A), P(B),
 P(C), P(D), P(E)]. For a general discussion of the relationship between vector spaces, bases, and span-
 ning, see KENNETH HOFFMAN & RAY KUNZE, LINEAR ALGEBRA 28-66 (2d ed. 1971).
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 Rigorously establishing the Unique Representation Principle requires some
 linear algebra, but the intuition behind the linear algebra is easy to understand.
 If there were two different combinations of assets from the minimal spanning
 set that generated the same cash flows, then subtracting the first combination
 from the second would yield a new combination with zero net cash flow. This
 new combination would include at least one asset with nonzero weight since
 the first and second combinations are different by assumption. Consequently,
 one of the assets in the minimal spanning set would have to be a combination
 of other assets in that set.40 This relationship contradicts the assumption that
 the spanning set is minimal. If combining certain assets in the set replicates the
 returns of another asset in the set, then that asset must be extraneous. A span-
 ning set is minimal only if it has no extraneous assets.
 The above 5-state economy example illustrates the Nonunique Minimal
 Spanning Set Principle. There were at least two minimal spanning sets for the
 economy in that example. More generally, it is possible to show that there are
 an infinite number of possible minimal spanning sets in any economy where
 there is more than one distinct asset. This result follows from the fact that there
 are many ways to recombine assets from one particular spanning set to generate
 another such set.41
 B. A Possibility Result: Using the Spanning Method to Create a Consistent
 and Universal Tax System
 The two principles derived in the previous section suggest that the spanning
 method may be used to design a consistent and universal tax system. This
 method consists of three steps. First, choose a particular minimal spanning set;
 40. For example, suppose that the minimal spanning set is [x, y, z] and that the following two
 combinations result in the same cash flow:
 3x + Sy + 2z;
 2x + 3y + 7z.
 Subtracting the second combination from the first yields:
 x + 2y - 5z.
 This third combination results in zero net cash flow since it is the difference of two combinations
 yielding identical cash flows. As a result, it must be true that
 x = 5z - 2y.
 In other words, holding asset x is equivalent to simultaneously holding a long position in five units of z
 and a short position in two units of y, and any portfolio formed from a combination of x, y, and z can be
 formed from a combination of y and z alone.
 41. For instance, in the 5-state example above, one could arbitrarily add any positive amount, cc,
 of C(O) to each of the assets C(121), C(242), C(363), and C(484) in the minimal spanning set [C(O),
 C(121), C(242), C(363), C(484)] and still have a minimal spanning set. The new set [C(O), C(121) +
 aC(O), C(242) + aC(O), C(363) + aC(O), C(484) + aC(O)] transforms into the set of insurance portfo-
 lios, [P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)], by first subtracting aC(O) from the last four assets and then apply-
 ing the transformation from [C(O), C(121), C(242), C(363), C(484)] to [P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)]
 given above. See text accompanying note 36 supra. There are an infinite number of positive numbers
 ax, and each choice of a yields a different minimal spanning set. Therefore, there are an infinite number
 of such sets.
 A more rigorous demonstration that there are an infinite number of minimal spanning sets follows
 from the fact that any set of assets generating returns that are an invertible linear transformation of the
 returns from the assets in the set [P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)] is itself a minimal spanning set. See
 note 39 supra. There are an infinite number of such transformations as long as the dimension of the
 return space is at least one. In the example, the dimension of the return space is five.
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 second, specify the tax treatment for each asset in that set and a rule for deter-
 mining the tax treatment for any possible combination of such assets; and third,
 impose the rule that the tax due on cash flows from any asset not in the minimal
 spanning set is the tax that would be due on the unique combination of minimal
 spanning set elements that generates the same cash flow pattern as the asset.42
 The Unique Representation Principle states that for any given minimal
 spanning set and any given attainable pattern of cash flows, there is a unique
 combination of assets in the chosen minimal spanning set that will generate the
 specified cash flow pattern. This principle guarantees that a tax system gener-
 ated by the spanning method will be consistent and universal. It will be consis-
 tent because the equivalent spanning set combination for any asset (or cash
 flow pattern) is unique, and each spanning set combination has a known tax
 treatment. It will be universal because any asset (and thus any attainable cash
 flow pattern) is equivalent to some combination of minimal spanning set assets.
 The spanning method begins with the choice of a single minimal spanning
 set for implementing the method. A choice is necessary because the
 Nonunique Minimal Spanning Set Principle indicates that more than one mini-
 mal spanning set exists. One could design a consistent and universal tax sys-
 tem that applies a different minimal spanning set to different asset groups.
 However, choosing a single minimal spanning set makes it unnecessary either
 to determine which minimal spanning set applies to any given cash flow pattern
 or to check for inconsistencies caused by applying multiple minimal spanning
 sets to sets of assets generating the same cash flow pattern.43
 Applying the spanning method in practice requires more detailed specifica-
 tion of the tax rules than simply setting out the three steps above. Of particular
 importance is the need to choose a method for determining the tax treatment of
 combinations of minimal spanning set elements. One simple choice is a "lin-
 ear" rule: The tax on a weighted sum of minimal spanning set assets is the
 weighted sum of the taxes on the assets using the same numerical weights.
 Thus, if stocks x and y are in the minimal spanning set, the tax on the combina-
 tion of five shares of stock x and two shares of stock y will be five times the tax
 on a share of stock x plus two times the tax on a share of stock y. One might
 distinguish the spanning method that uses this linear rule by calling it the "lin-
 ear variant" of the spanning method. Because this article only considers this
 linear variant, however, this terminology is unnecessary.44 In the discussion
 42. The second step in the spanning method, specifying the tax treatment for each asset in the
 minimal spanning set, is similar to the cubbyhole approach under current law that specifies the tax
 treatment for certain familiar transactions. However, the spanning method also provides a determinate
 way of deciding how to tax an asset that does not have a specified treatment because it is not in the
 minimal spanning set. Under current law, there is no such determinate method for assets that do not fall
 into any existing cubbyhole. As a result, judges and administrators have difficulty dealing with new
 financial products.
 43. There are potential benefits from using more than one minimal spanning set. Some cash flow
 patterns may be easier to decompose (into spanning set assets) using one minimal spanning set while
 other cash flow patterns may be easier to decompose using a different minimal spanning set.
 44. Clearly, it is possible to employ nonlinear rules for computing the taxes on combinations of
 minimal spanning set elements. The linear rule is particularly interesting because of the strong connec-
 tion, described below, between the linear variant of the spanning method and bifurcation approaches.
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 below, the term "spanning method" shall mean the linear variant of the span-
 ning method rather than the more general class of all possible spanning
 methods.45
 To illustrate the application of the spanning method, consider once again
 the 5-state example delineated above. Suppose that the minimal spanning set
 chosen to apply the method is the set [C(0), C(121), C(242), C(363), C(484)].
 Suppose also that someone invents a new financial asset called "D-insurance"
 that provides insurance against state D occurring. One share of D-insurance
 yields $121 in state D at the end of year two but yields $0 if any of the other
 states (A, B, C, or E) occur.
 Having chosen the minimal spanning set, the next step is to specify the tax
 treatment of each of the five assets in that set. Suppose that the tax code calls
 for taxing these assets on a cash flow basis, but at unequal rates: 40 percent for
 C(O), C(121), C(242), and C(363), but 20 percent for C(484). Conceptually,
 this pattern is tantamount to permitting a favorable capital gain rate on the
 C(484) asset while taxing the remaining assets at a higher, ordinary income
 rate.
 D-insurance is equivalent to 121 units of the asset denoted P(D) above.46
 The unique decomposition of P(D) in terms of minimal spanning set assets is:
 P(D) = (1/121) x [C(363) - (2 x C(484))]
 The unique decomposition of D-insurance is therefore:
 D-insurance = C(363) - (2 x C(484))
 Thus, under the spanning method, the tax on D-insurance is equivalent to the
 tax on one long position in C(363) plus the tax on two short positions in
 C(484). Applying the appropriate rates, the taxes faced by an owner of D-
 insurance at the end of year two in the various states are as follows:
 See text accompanying notes 69-76 infra. The linear rule also is natural for those who are accustomed
 to the present United States tax system. In general, the tax on N units of an asset such as a stock or a
 bond is simply N times the tax on one unit of the asset. Finally, variants of the spanning method with
 more complicated rules fall under the general category of integration approaches. The second and third
 steps of the spanning method assign a unique tax treatment to every possible cash flow pattern. Later
 portions of this article show that the set of all possible ways to assign a unique tax treatment to each
 possible cash flow pattern is a particular set of integration approaches. See text accompanying note 68
 infra.
 45. This distinction is important because some of the results below concerning "the spanning
 method" are only true when the linear rule applies for computing the tax due on a combination of
 minimal spanning set elements. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 69-70 infra, note 70 infra.
 46. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
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 TABLE III
 Return on Tax on Return on Tax on Return on Tax on
 State C(363) C(363) -2C(484) -2C(484) D-insurance D-insurance
 A $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
 B $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
 C $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
 D $121 $48.40 $0 $0 $121 $48.40
 E $242 $96.80 -$242 -$48.40 $0 $48.40
 This analysis yields one peculiar result: In state E, owners of D-insurance pay
 a tax of $48.40 even though D-insurance returns nothing in that state. This
 anomaly exists because the tax system applies different rates to cash flows from
 C(363) and C(484). Recall that the tax system treats D-insurance as if it were a
 portfolio of these two assets. Thus, when state E occurs, the $96.80 tax on the
 gain from the long position in C(363) exceeds the $48.40 deduction on the
 capital loss from the two short positions in C(484).
 Thus far, the analysis has had an optimistic tenor. If the government can
 identify a minimal spanning set, it can fashion a tax system that is consistent
 and universal. This "possibility result" holds true regardless of how the gov-
 ernment specifies the tax treatment for assets in the minimal spanning set. The
 treatment of different assets may be conceptually distinct.
 Nonetheless, the positive tax on a zero net cash flow outcome for state E in
 the 5-state example is disturbing.47 This result violates the obvious precept that
 when there is no income or net cash flow, an investor should not pay any tax.
 The cause of the result is the dissimilar treatment of certain assets: The system
 applies a more favorable tax rate to C(484) than to other assets. Equalizing the
 applicable rates on all assets would eliminate the problem. However, dispari-
 ties such as a special tax rate for C(484) may have countervailing theoretical or
 economic justifications. Although the spanning method allows the tax system
 47. One cannot justify this $48.40 tax on a zero net cash flow as an offset for some tax benefit
 resulting from the purchase of the D-insurance. To demonstrate this, recall that D-insurance is
 equivalent to one long position in C(363) combined with two short positions in C(484). Assuming that
 investors are risk neutral and that the interest rate is 10%, one can calculate the prices of each option. A
 C(363) option pays $121 in state D and $242 in state E and nothing in any other state. The $121 and
 $242 cash flows have present values of $100 and $200 ($121/(1.10)2 and $242/(1.10)2, respectively).
 Given that states D and E each have a one-fifth chance of occurring, a risk-neutral investor would
 compute the present value of C(363) as the sum of one-fifth of $100 and one-fifth of $200, for a total of
 $60. Thus, the market price of C(363) must equal this $60 present value. A similar computation yields
 $20 as the price of C(484). As a result, the pretax price of D-insurance at time 0 is $20, the $60 cost of
 buying one unit of C(363) less two times the $20 revenue from writing a C(484) option.
 What are the possible tax benefits associated with purchasing D-insurance? The example in the
 text presumes a cash flow tax system. In such a system, there is a deduction for net investment. At a
 40% tax rate, the tax benefit for the $20 net investment would be $8. This amount would increase to
 $16 under an approach that considers the components of D-insurance separately: The holder would
 deduct the $60 cost of the C(363) using a 40% rate and would pay a tax at the special 20% rate that
 applies to C(484) on the receipt of the $40 from writing two C(484) options. In contrast to the possible
 initial tax benefit of $8 or $16, the tax at the end of year two is $48.40, and the present value of this tax
 as of the time of the initial benefit is $40. The resulting net tax, with a present value of $24 to $32, is
 totally inappropriate (under conventional tax reasoning) given that the pretax net result for the investor
 is a loss equal to the entire initial investment of $20.
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 to remain consistent and universal in the face of some desired disparities, there
 is a potential cost in terms of "tax aesthetics" since the tax treatment of some
 transactions will not make sense under standard tax concepts.
 In actuality, tax systems often contain disparities, and the United States tax
 system is no exception. An accretion tax applies to some assets while other
 assets are taxed only upon realization of gains or losses. Corporate assets are
 subject to an extra layer of taxation. Different rates apply to income from capi-
 tal and ordinary assets. The loss carryover rules create an asymmetry between
 the taxes of losses and gains. The next section analyzes how these disparities
 affect the ability to create a consistent and universal tax system using the span-
 ning method. Unfortunately, some of these disparities cause "impossibility re-
 sults" to replace the possibility result developed above. This consequence goes
 far beyond the problem that attaining consistency and universality using the
 spanning method may require a sacrifice of tax aesthetics.
 C. Some Impossibility Results: Limits on the Spanning Method
 Any proposal for taxing new financial products faces the real world con-
 straint that numerous assets in the economy have a predetermined tax treat-
 ment-that is, a treatment that a policymaker must take as given in devising
 rules. Predetermined treatments are especially troubling when they are based
 on differing principles (e.g., accretion versus realization). When determining
 the tax treatment of new financial products, these predetermined treatments
 preclude the Treasury Department and the courts from implementing a global
 taxation approach. As a result, comprehensive reform to achieve a single
 global pattern for the taxation of all assets cannot be accomplished through
 regulations or court decisions.
 The effects of constraints created by predetermined tax treatments are evi-
 dent in the 5-state example from the previous section. In that example, the
 available assets were two zero coupon bonds and a stock. Under current United
 States tax law, the bonds, like other zero coupon bonds, would be subject to
 OID rules that have an accretion aspect. The rules impute a stream of interest
 payments to the bond and impose a tax on these payments even though the
 payments are fictional.48 On the other hand, current law generally does not
 impose a tax on the returns from stock until the returns are realized as either
 distributions or as capital gains upon sale. Thus, the stock in the example
 would not be taxed until the distribution at the end of year two.
 The preordained tax treatments of bonds and stocks constrain the choice of
 tax treatments for the five assets in the particular minimal spanning set chosen
 48. Pure accretion treatment would require taxing the total change in value of the bond each year
 rather than merely the interest component estimated under the OID rules. These two approaches differ
 because the total change in value of a bond during each year may differ from the amount of interest
 imputed to the bond based on the initial fixed schedule of payments. For example, if interest rates
 increase during the life of the bond, the capital value of the bond will decline so that the total gain in
 some years will be less than the amount of interest imputed to the bond. Nonetheless, the OID rules are
 a step toward pure accretion treatment. One can view the OID component as an estimate of the annual
 change in value of the bond, and this estimated increase is taxed even though it is unrealized.
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 for applying the spanning method. To fit into the overall tax scheme, the tax on
 combinations of these assets that correspond to bonds and stocks must corre-
 spond to the predetermined rules.
 Suppose that the minimal spanning set chosen for applying the spanning
 method is [C(0), C(121), C(242), C(363), C(484)]. This set is a particularly
 instructive choice because all of the assets in the set are call options, instru-
 ments that have a specific tax treatment under current law. For now, however,
 assume that the tax treatment of these instruments need not be the same as
 under current law.
 The stock in the hypothetical economy is simply the asset C(0), which is
 already an element of the minimal spanning set.49 The initial value of the stock
 is $300, and there is no dividend or other realization event until the end of year
 two. At the end of year two, the shareholder receives a cash distribution (repre-
 senting the total return on the stock) in exchange for each share. Thus, there is
 no tax at the end of year one, but the cash distribution net of the $300 cost per
 share is taxable income at the end of year two.
 The 2-year zero coupon bond appreciates from $100 to $110 during year
 one and then from $110 to $121 during year two. Under current law, this ap-
 preciation results in OID income of $10 at the end of year one and $11 at the
 end of year two. Assuming a 40 percent tax rate, the bondholder will pay taxes
 of $4 and $4.40 at the end of years one and two, respectively.
 None of the five assets in the minimal spanning set [C(O), C(121), C(242),
 C(363), C(484)] corresponds exactly to the 2-year zero coupon bond. How-
 ever, the bond is a simple combination of two of the assets in that set, one of
 which is the stock. Denoting the bond B(2) and the stock S, the following
 identity applies:
 B(2) = C(O) - C(121) = S - C(121).
 Because the tax treatments of both the stock and the 2-year zero coupon
 bond are predetermined, this equation implicitly specifies a tax treatment for
 C(121). The tax on C(121) must equal the tax on a position that is long one
 share of the stock and short one bond:50
 C(121) = S - B(2).
 A party holding C(121) would deduct the $10 imputed interest on the bond at
 the end of year one, resulting in a $4 tax benefit at a 40 percent rate. At the end
 49. A call option with a zero exercise price on a limited liability asset (such as the stock) is
 monetarily equivalent to the asset. This equivalency exists because limited liability implies that the
 lowest possible payoff is zero, and a call option with a zero exercise price is the right to receive any
 return above zero.
 50. This equation is the put-call parity equation where the put has zero value. The general form of
 the put-call parity equation is:
 S + P = C + PV(X)
 where S is an underlying asset, C is a call on S at exercise price X, P is a put on S at exercise price X,
 and PV(X) is the discounted present value of X, calculated using the time until expiration and a riskless
 discount rate. No put term appears in the equation in the text since the exercise price is $121, the lowest
 possible outcome for the stock. A put will only be valuable if there is a possibility that the value of the
 underlying asset will fall below the exercise price. The bond ensures a return of $121 at the end of year
 two. As a result, the present value of the bond is the present value of the $121 exercise price.
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 of year two, the holder would deduct $11 for that year's imputed interest on the
 bond.51 In addition, the cash distribution paid in exchange for the stock at the
 end of year two would trigger a tax.
 Because the tax treatments of the bond and the stock are predetermined, the
 policymaker no longer has the freedom to choose the tax treatment of C(O) and
 C(121), two of the five assets in the minimal spanning set. However, complete
 freedom to choose the tax treatment of the other three assets remains.
 Conveniently, the treatment of these three remaining assets can be chosen
 to create a generic treatment for call options. In particular, the government
 could tax each call option as if it were equivalent to holding the underlying
 asset and borrowing an amount equal to the difference between that asset's
 value and the cost of the option at the time of purchase.52 This generic rule is
 consistent with the predetermined treatments for C(0) and C(121) under current
 law. These treatments impute no borrowing for C(O), the stock, and $100 of
 borrowing for C(121). The appropriate amount of imputed borrowing for C(0)
 under the generic rule is also zero. C(121) has an initial value of $200 com-
 51. Under current law, corporate issuers may deduct the imputed interest payments on zero cou-
 pon bonds. See I.R.C. ? 163(e) (1988). However, it is unclear whether a deduction for imputed interest
 is available if a nonissuing entity (such as an individual investor) sells a zero coupon bond short.
 Selling short involves borrowing the security that is sold. Consequently, the short seller must pay
 the lender any dividend or interest payments due on the security during the period that the seller holds
 the short position. When these payments are in cash, it is clear from the statute that any short seller may
 deduct the payments as investment interest so long as the security sold short is not a tax-exempt security.
 See I.R.C. ?? 163(d)(3)(C), 265(a)(5) (1988). The terms of the statute include as deductible any
 amounts "paid or incurred," see id., but it is not clear that these terms cover imputed interest since the
 short seller does not owe that interest to anyone.
 A zero coupon bond will tend to appreciate in an amount equal to the imputed interest, thereby
 creating a loss in that amount for the short seller. Because the short seller cannot deduct the imputed
 interest payments directly, he must deduct them as a loss (to the extent they are reflected in appreciation
 of the bond) upon closing the short position. This result is disadvantageous for the short seller (com-
 pared to deducting each year's imputed interest payments against ordinary income) because the loss will
 often be a capital loss and the short seller cannot deduct the loss until the time of sale.
 A 1972 Revenue Ruling suggests that the government will treat obligations of a short seller other
 than cash payments discharging dividend or interest obligations as amounts paid for replacing a bor-
 rowed security, which are nondeductible capital expenditures. See Rev. Rul. 72-521, 1972-2 C.B. 178
 (holding that a short seller of stock may deduct payments covering cash dividends on the stock but may
 not deduct either the payment of a nontaxable liquidating dividend or the cost of covering additional
 shares from a nontaxable stock dividend). However, this Revenue Ruling is factually distinguishable
 because it disallowed deductions for nontaxable dividends. The imputed interest from zero coupon
 bonds is taxable.
 In general, to achieve consistency, a tax system must treat opposite positions symmetrically. In
 other words, the tax treatment that applies to a short position must be the negative of tax treatment for
 the corresponding long position. Otherwise, combining equal long and short positions would result in a
 net tax effect even though the net cash flow is zero. Although special treatment (such as zeroing out the
 tax results) might be accorded to any situation where a short and a long position offset each other, such
 treatment might not be very effective. A taxpayer could avoid the required special treatment by con-
 structing positions that fall short of, but come close to, perfectly offsetting short and long positions. For
 a more complete discussion of this "approximate arbitrage" maneuver, see text accompanying notes 80-
 84 infra.
 52. The writer of a call option would receive symmetric treatment. Symmetric treatment of short
 and long positions is necessary to ensure consistency. See note 51 supra.
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 pared to the $300 initial value of the underlying asset, C(0). As a result, $100
 of imputed borrowing is appropriate under the generic rule as well.53
 This generic rule for call options conflicts with the treatment of options
 under current law, which does not impute borrowing to the holder.54 However,
 given the predetermined treatments of the stock and the 2-year zero coupon
 bond, consistency requires that an imputed borrowing rule apply to at least the
 C(121) call option.
 One response to this problem would be to revise the current rules for taxa-
 tion of options. This reform would be very limited in scope, involving only
 three sections in the Code.55 Reform of the option rules therefore could be
 regarded as an easy step that would be worthwhile if it led to a coherent way to
 tax new financial products.
 Unfortunately, reforming the tax treatment of options will not suffice to
 ensure successful implementation of the spanning method. Other ambiguities
 and tensions deeply embedded in current tax law create substantial impedi-
 ments. One example is the distinction between "stocks" and "bonds." This
 distinction is so ambiguous that direct inconsistencies in taxation result.
 Suppose, for example, that a corporation engages in a project with returns
 of $242, $363, $484, $605, and $726 in states A, B, C, D, and E, respectively.
 In terms of the 5-state economy example, this project generates returns equal to
 the returns from holding one share of the stock and one 2-year zero coupon
 bond. Consistency would require taxing the 2-year bond portion of the project
 under an OID approach. Under current law, however, if the corporation fi-
 nances the project with equity, it can defer the tax on all of the project's returns
 until the end of year two. In short, current law prescribes sharply different
 treatments for stocks and bonds without making clear the relevant distinguish-
 53. This generic treatment does not accord with the most general form of the put-call parity equa-
 tion. That equation shows that the value of a call is equal to the value of the asset minus the present
 value of a loan plus the value of a put. The put has the same exercise price as the call, and the loan
 represents the obligation to pay the exercise price on the expiration date of the option.
 Although the suggested treatment in the text neglects the put, including the put value in the formula
 does not present a consistency problem. Because the stock yields a minimum of $121, the value of puts
 at strike prices of $0 and $121 (corresponding to the calls C(O) and C(121)) would be zero, and these
 puts would not result in any cash flows. See note 50 supra. Consistency requires there be no tax
 consequences from any such "investment." See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra (arguing that
 arbitrage transactions that cost nothing and yield no net cash flows should not have any tax conse-
 quences); cf text accompanying notes 46-47 supra (noting that consistency may require tax on a zero
 cash flow outcome for an investment that is costly and that produces nonzero cash flows in some states
 of the world). As a result, adding these worthless puts to any portfolio will not affect the sum of the tax
 treatments of the assets from the portfolio.
 54. Sale of an equity option before it expires results in either a capital gain or capital loss, which
 will be short or long term depending on the holding period for the option. If the option expires worth-
 less, the tax laws treat the expiration as equivalent to the sale of the option on the expiration date for $0.
 Exercising a call option results in the addition of the option price to the price paid for the stock for
 purposes of determnining the total cost basis of the stock. See I.R.C. ? 1234 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
 Special mark-to-market rules apply to options on futures and other nonequity options. See I.R.C.
 ? 1256 (1988).
 55. I.R.C. ?? 1234, 1234A & 1256 (1988). Commentators have argued that the current treatment
 of options impedes the effort to design rules for taxing new financial products and has little or no
 justification on tax policy or tax theory grounds. See, e.g., Hariton, New Rules, supra note 3, at 239;
 Kleinbard, supra note 3, at 950-51.
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 ing characteristics. Indeed, even the paradigmatic stock in the 5-state example
 contains a built-in bond component.56
 The spanning method cannot resolve ambiguity that runs this deep. If tax
 policy requires distinct treatments for stocks and bonds, these categories must
 be defined much more precisely. Implementing precise definitions, however,
 would require fundamental and comprehensive reform, overturning familiar tax
 treatments for numerous financial instruments.57
 Professor Reed Shuldiner's rule of "expected value taxation" provides an
 example of this kind of reform. This rule divides financial instruments into a
 noncontingent portion representing the expected return from the instrument and
 a contingent portion representing deviations from that expected return.58 The
 rule would treat the stock in the 5-state example as the sum of three 2-year zero
 coupon bonds and a risky residual component with zero initial value:59
 TABLE IV: THE STOCK AND ITS CONTINGENT AND NONCONTINGENT
 COMPONENTS
 Return of Instrument or Component
 State Stock Noncontingent Component Contingent Component
 A $121 $363 -$242
 B $242 $363 -$121
 C $363 $363 $0
 D $484 $363 $121
 E $605 $363 $242
 This approach eliminates bond/stock ambiguities by providing a determi-
 nate way to isolate the bond component in any risky investment. However,
 applying this method across the board would require substantially revising the
 current treatment of equity instruments.60
 56. The stock returns at least $121 in all five states of the world. See Table I supra.
 57. Rules that rely heavily on the fragile distinction between equity and debt also create major
 problems in corporate law. See Hu, Shareholder Welfare, supra note 2, at 1286-1300 (noting that
 whether a security is equity or debt or a known hybrid affects the legal rights of the holder and that
 financial innovation has produced many instruments that are hard to categorize).
 58. See Shuldiner, supra note 10, at 284-85.
 David Hariton has proposed an approach for taxing contingent debt obligations that resembles
 Professor Shuldiner's rule. Under Hariton's scheme, taxable income in the form of interest or OID
 would accrue on the revised issue price of the debt at no less than the applicable annual federal rate. See
 Hariton, New Rules, supra note 3, at 238.
 59. Three 2-year zero coupon bonds would cost $300 at time 0 and yield $363 in all states of the
 world at the end of year two. Since the stock's value at time 0 is $300, the value of the contingent
 portion of the stock that remains after subtracting the three bonds must be $0. Table IV also illustrates
 why the contingent portion has zero value. The expected return of the contingent portion is $0, and risk-
 neutral investors will value an asset with zero expected return at $0.
 60. In addition, applying this approach (or another approach with a similar ability to clarify the
 bond/stock distinction) only to new financial instruments will not result in consistency. The inconsis-
 tency problem arises from the tax treatment of old financial instruments: Bond/stock combinations with
 identical cash flows incur different tax liabilities under existing rules.
 Furthermore, applying a generic treatment to new financial instruments may introduce new incon-
 sistencies into the tax system. One may be able to invent new instruments that replicate the returns of
 the bond and stock assets to which the old rules apply. For example, an appropriate mixture of assets
This content downloaded from 131.215.225.150 on Mon, 28 Aug 2017 21:50:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 592 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:569
 D. A Perspective on the Results
 The previous sections demonstrate that a tax system can be consistent and
 universal even when it treats certain classes of transactions quite differently.
 For example, one type of asset might be subject to an accretion rule while
 another is subject to a realization rule.
 However, the flexibility in choosing tax treatments is not unlimited. If the
 tax law overconstrains the system by specifying a tax treatment for too many
 assets, the spanning method will fail. In particular, the number of distinct pre-
 determined tax treatments cannot exceed the number of states.61 In addition,
 even if there are many states (as there undoubtedly are in the real world), a
 universal and consistent tax system cannot contain direct inconsistencies such
 as that between the current tax treatment of options and the current tax treat-
 ment of stocks and bonds.62 Finally, even if the system is not overconstrained
 and does not contain direct inconsistencies, choosing radically different theoret-
 ical approaches for particular paradigmatic transactions can prove costly in
 terms of tax system aesthetics: Consistency may require a tax treatment for
 some transactions that does not make sense under any theoretical or conceptual
 approach. For example, investors may have to pay a significant tax in some
 instances where there is zero net income and zero net cash flow.63
 Unfortunately, reform of the current system would require much more than
 simple adjustments and the acceptance of unpleasant aesthetics. Although it
 would be easy to remove some of the current system's inconsistencies, such as
 those stemming from the tax treatment of options, only comprehensive reform
 could remove others, such as those stemming from the lack of a clear delinea-
 tion between stocks and bonds.64 A quick survey of current tax law reveals
 many potential sources of additional inconsistencies and ambiguities: the dis-
 from the set [P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)] consisting of insurance portfolios can replicate the payoffs
 of the stock:
 S = $121 P(A) + $242 P(B) + $363 P(C) + $484 P(D) + $605 P(E).
 Unless the generic treatment for this mixture of insurance portfolios is the same as the treatment of the
 stock under the existing rules, inconsistency will result.
 61. Specifying a tax treatment for a particular type of "target" asset requires that the combination
 of minimal spanning set elements that is equivalent to that asset receive the same tax treatment. If the
 number of distinct elements in the minimal spanning set that make up the combination is N, a policy-
 maker may choose tax treatments arbitrarily for only N-1 minimal spanning set elements, as the system
 must tax the remaining element in such a way that the entire combination receives the same tax treat-
 ment as the target asset. Thus, the cost of requiring a predetermined tax treatment for any one target
 asset is a loss of the freedom to specify the tax treatment of one element of the minimal spanning set,
 and imposing particular tax treatments on N target assets or portfolios in the economy requires specify-
 ing the tax treatment of N elements of the minimal spanning set. See text accompanying notes 48-52
 supra (demonstrating that imposing specific tax treatment on two target assets, stocks and bonds, deter-
 mines the tax treatment of two elements of the minimal spanning set). Since the number of assets in the
 minimal spanning set equals the number of states, see note 39 supra and accompanying text, the ability
 to impose a predetermined tax treatment for any additional target asset ends when the number of target
 assets with predetermined treatment equals the number of states. At that point, the restrictions on the
 system determine the tax treatment of every asset in the minimal spanning set and thus every asset or
 portfolio in the economy.
 62. See text accompanying notes 49-55 supra.
 63. See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
 64. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
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 tinction between capital and ordinary treatment, the "double taxation" of corpo-
 rate income, the asymmetry in treatment between gains and losses, nonlinear
 (e.g., progressive) rate structures, and the body of source rules that deal with
 foreign taxpayers. In addition, the difficulties for the spanning method re-
 vealed by examining a simple economy as in the sections above would persist
 or intensify in a more realistic model with more than five periods and more
 than two states.65
 The positive result that the spanning method can produce a consistent and
 universal tax system in the face of disparate tax treatments for different asset
 types is nonetheless interesting. Even substantial reform is likely to result in a
 "hybrid" tax system that does not apply the same treatment to all assets. It is
 useful to know that such systems may accommodate theoretically distinct ap-
 proaches for different assets and still be consistent and universal. Furthermore,
 as discussed in the next Part, several approaches currently advocated for deal-
 ing with new financial products can only be successful if they reduce to the
 spanning method.
 II. BEYOND THE SPANNING METHOD: A GENERAL FRAMEWORK
 As noted above, the prevailing view seems to be that global pattern taxation
 is the only comprehensive solution to the problem of taxing new financial prod-
 ucts.66 If a particular generic tax treatment, such as accretion taxation or cash
 flow taxation, applies to all existing financial instruments, the government can
 simply apply this same treatment to any new financial product. While difficul-
 ties in implementation that require approximations and compromises might
 arise,67 the approach would be clear and coherent.
 The previous Part shows that by using the spanning method it is possible to
 design a consistent and universal system for taxing new financial products that
 does not require prescribing a comprehensive treatment for all transactions.
 The above analysis does not indicate, however, whether the spanning method is
 the only approach that provides this result. In fact, spanning method ap-
 proaches are only a subset of all successful approaches. Some alternative ap-
 proaches are less restrictive but still yield consistency and universality.
 This Part aims to provide a logical taxonomy of theoretical approaches for
 designing tax systems and then to relate this taxonomy to practical approaches,
 such as bifurcation and integration. To accomplish these tasks it is necessary to
 develop several refinements of the concept of consistency.
 65. The real world obviously includes more than five outcomes and two time periods. Although
 increasing the number of states would increase the freedom to specify tax treatments, direct inconsisten-
 cies would not vanish. In addition, an increase in the number of states would make computing the
 proper tax treatment for a new asset more complex and probably would lead to worse tax aesthetics.
 66. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
 67. See, e.g., Mike Graetz, Expenditure Tax Design, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR
 EXPENDITURE 161 (J. Pechman ed., 1980) (discussing implementation issues for cash flow taxation); Jeff
 Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. 1817, 1891-99
 (1990) (discussing the implementation of accretion taxation when asset price paths are unknown).
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 Section A shows that all taxation methods that are consistent and universal
 can be expressed as integration schemes. Thus, the class of successful bifurca-
 tion and local pattern approaches is a subset of the class of successful integra-
 tion schemes. Section B introduces the property of linearity, a property that
 implies consistency, and states two principal results: First, any linear and uni-
 versal tax system reduces to the spanning method; second, any consistent and
 universal bifurcation approach must be linear. Thus, bifurcation approaches
 that are consistent and universal are equivalent to the spanning method. In
 addition, local pattern taxation will be consistent and universal only if it
 reduces either to the spanning method or to an integration scheme. Section C
 explores integration schemes. These schemes can provide a consistent and uni-
 versal tax system even when the system is not required to be linear. This trait
 is important because modern tax systems tend to have significant nonlinearities.
 Section C also develops the concept of continuity, a condition that is weaker
 than linearity but stronger than consistency, and shows that all continuous and
 universal tax systems reduce to an integration scheme. In contrast, the span-
 ning method will only succeed if the tax system is linear as well as continuous
 and universal. Continuity is important because its absence creates the same
 undesirable effects that follow from inconsistency.
 A. Entire Integration and Consistency
 Combining a taxpayer's portfolio into one single position and then associat-
 ing a tax treatment with that position is a form of integration called "entire
 integration."68 Since any universal and consistent tax system associates to each
 total position a unique tax treatment, the following principle is true:
 The Entire Integration Principle: Any consistent and universal tax system is
 equivalent to an entire integration approach.
 Some integration approaches may aggregate only certain groups of instru-
 ments but not the taxpayer's complete portfolio. Under the Entire Integration
 Principle, however, any consistent and universal integration method can be
 treated as if it did integrate the whole portfolio, since each aggregate position
 68. Mathematically inclined readers will realize that there is an easy way to describe any entire
 integration scheme. It is a function that maps the vector space of portfolios into a vector space of tax
 outcomes.
 It is easy to see that the set of all portfolios, as well as the set of all portfolio returns, see note 39
 supra, forms a vector space. First, choose a particular minimal spanning set. Each portfolio is a unique
 combination of assets in this set. The amounts of each minimal spanning set asset in the portfolio are
 the coordinates of the portfolio in the vector space. In the text example, this vector space is a five-
 dimensional Euclidean space.
 The space of tax outcomes consists of vectors specifying how much tax will be paid at the end of
 each period in each state of the world. In the text example, these vectors will be 10-dimensional, each
 representing the taxes paid at the end of years one and two in each of the five states of the world. Of
 course, the set of all possible tax outcomes in the example will be isomorphic to a space with fewer than
 10 dimensions since the taxes paid at the end of the first year are not contingent on the state of the
 world. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
 If we denote the space of portfolios as P and the space of tax outcomes as T, then an entire
 integration scheme is a function 0 that maps P into T. Requiring that 0 be a function (rather than a
 correspondence) captures the feature that an entire integration scheme specifies a unique set of tax
 outcomes for each portfolio.
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 must result in the same tax treatment no matter which combination of compo-
 nents led to the position. Furthermore, any method that achieves consistency
 and universality can be expressed as an entire integration scheme. Thus, all
 consistent and universal bifurcation methods and all consistent and universal
 local pattern approaches belong to the set of consistent and universal integra-
 tion approaches.
 The spanning method is one particular method of bifurcation that assures
 consistency and universality. The Entire Integration Principle indicates that the
 class of consistent and universal tax systems are precisely those that are
 equivalent to an entire integration scheme. Do all such systems also reduce to
 the spanning method? The answer is that they do not. The next section shows
 that the class of universal tax systems that reduce to the spanning method is
 precisely the class of all such systems that are linear. Some entire integration
 schemes are not linear and thus do not reduce to the spanning method.
 B. Linearity, Bifurcation, and the Spanning Method
 A tax system is linear if the tax treatment of an asset or portfolio is the sum
 of the tax treatments of the components that make up the asset or portfolio.69
 Linearity requires that the tax treatment of any portfolio remain the same re-
 gardless of the manner in which the portfolio is divided into particular assets.
 As a result, linearity implies consistency. Section C shows that there are con-
 sistent tax systems which are not linear. Thus, linearity is a stronger condition
 than consistency.
 The class of tax systems that are both linear and universal is exactly the
 class that can be implemented by the spanning method:
 Spanning Method Principle: Any universal and linear tax system is equivalent
 to the application of the spanning method using any minimal spanning set.
 Conversely, the spanning method will result in universality and linearity under
 any choice for the minimal spanning set.
 Proving this principle is straightforward. Suppose a tax system is universal and
 linear, and choose any minimal spanning set. Since the system is universal, it
 prescribes a tax treatment for every asset, including each asset in the chosen
 minimal spanning set. Since the system is linear and since it is possible to
 express any cash flow pattern as a combination of assets from the minimal
 spanning set, the tax treatment of the spanning set elements uniquely deter-
 mines the tax treatment for all cash flow patterns and assets. Thus, all linear
 and universal tax systems reduce to the spanning method. The converse is also
 true: The spanning method guarantees that the tax system is linear and
 universal.70
 69. It may be helpful to define linearity mathematically using the framework of note 68 supra. In
 that framework, a function 0 that maps portfolios to tax outcomes represents the tax system. That
 system will be linear if, for any two portfolios x and y and for any two numbers q and r (representing
 ways of mixing the portfolios), qO(x) + rO(y) = O(qx) + 0(ry) = 0(qx + ry).
 70. The converse follows from the assumption that the rule for computing the tax on combinations
 of minimal spanning set assets under the spanning method is linear. See text accompanying notes 43-45
 supra. A portfolio is a weighted sum of a collection of assets, and each asset, in turn, is a unique
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 There is a natural connection between the concept of linearity and bifurca-
 tion methods. "Pure" bifurcation methods permit any decomposition of a par-
 ticular portfolio for the purpose of computing taxes. An example is the
 bifurcation scheme in the 1991 version of the Treasury Department's Proposed
 Regulations for contingent debt.71 This scheme does not specify a particular
 method of decomposing contingent debt into pieces in order to compute the tax
 treatment of the whole.72 Critics of bifurcation in general, as well as critics of
 the specific proposal in Treasury's 1991 Proposed Regulations, emphasize the
 possibility that different decompositions may lead to different tax treatments.73
 This problem will exist unless the tax system is linear. Linearity requires that
 the tax treatment of the whole be the sum of the tax treatments of the parts, so
 that it is a necessary condition for pure bifurcation to work. But linearity is
 also a sufficient condition since it implies consistency. In a linear system, dif-
 ferent decompositions cannot lead to different aggregate tax consequences.
 Pure bifurcation, such as the scheme envisioned in the 1991 contingent debt
 regulations, will not work in a nonlinear tax system. In such a tax system there
 will be at least one portfolio and at least one decomposition of that portfolio
 under which the sum of the tax treatments of the parts does not add up to the
 tax treatment of the whole. To be consistent, the tax system cannot permit an
 arbitrary decomposition of any such portfolio for tax purposes. Instead, the tax
 system must assign a specific tax treatment to the portfolio that is independent
 of the treatment that would emerge from summing the taxes under particular
 decompositions. This feature is the hallmark of integration: The taxpayer does
 not have the freedom to characterize a transaction or portfolio position accord-
 ing to the tax treatments of the pieces but must apply a single specified tax
 treatment to the whole. To avoid the requirement of linearity and still retain
 consistency, an element of integration must be mixed with any bifurcation
 approach.74
 Local pattern taxation does not require much additional discussion. As
 demonstrated above, every consistent and universal tax approach is equivalent
 canonical combination of assets from the minimal spanning set. The portfolio is also a unique canonical
 combination of spanning set assets. Since each cash flow pattern has a unique representation in terms of
 minimal spanning set assets, the canonical combination for the portfolio must equal the sum of the
 canonical combinations for the assets comprising the portfolio. See text accompanying notes 39-40
 supra. Because the rule for computing the tax on combinations of minimal spanning set elements is
 linear, the tax on a combination from that set must equal the sum of the taxes on the components in any
 linear decomposition of that combination. As a result, the tax on any portfolio will equal the sum of the
 taxes on the assets that comprise the portfolio.
 71. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking FI-189-84, 1991-1 C.B. 834, 835.
 72. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
 73. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
 74. For example, one might bifurcate according to one minimal spanning set for one type of
 transaction and according to a second minimal spanning set for another type. See note 43 supra and
 accompanying text. This approach would result in a tax system that is not linear if the tax treatments of
 certain transactions depend on which spanning set applies. To ensure consistency, the tax system would
 have to specify the treatment of such transactions, independent of the treatments that might arise from
 some possible decompositions. An element of integration would therefore be present.
 The spanning method avoids the need to use integration by requiring that one particular minimal
 spanning set be chosen for decomposing all instruments. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
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 to some integration scheme.75 Moreover, it is possible to implement any linear
 and universal system using a bifurcation scheme based on the spanning
 method.76 Departures from linearity require that the tax system include an inte-
 gration element in order to maintain consistency.77 Whether a system that
 employs local pattern taxation is linear or nonlinear, therefore, this ostensibly
 alternative approach is actually extraneous, at least for analytic purposes.
 C. Integration Revisited: Nonlinear Tax Systems and Continuity
 Integration by definition ignores the composition of portfolios in favor of
 their aggregate. As a result, under integration, a tax system can be consistent
 without being linear: The sum of the tax treatments of assets in a portfolio
 need not equal the tax treatment of the portfolio. Since linearity demands more
 of a system than consistency, the spanning method, which entails linearity, rep-
 resents only a subset of all consistent and universal integration approaches.
 Since every consistent and universal tax system reduces to an entire integra-
 tion scheme,78 classifying consistent and universal tax systems is a matter of
 classifying entire integration approaches. One part of this task is finished.
 From the Spanning Method Principle,79 it is clear that the set of all linear and
 universal systems encompasses precisely the set of all systems that reduce to
 the spanning method:
 Linearity Property: An entire integration scheme (i.e., any consistent and uni-
 versal tax system) is linear if and only if the scheme can be generated by the
 spanning method.
 To further refine the classification of integration approaches, it is useful to
 introduce continuity, a concept that lies between linearity and consistency. An
 entire integration scheme is "continuous" if portfolios that are nearly identical
 have nearly identical tax treatments.80 In particular, small changes in any port-
 folio will not cause a "jump" in the tax results.
 75. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
 76. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
 77. Cf text accompanying notes 73-74 supra.
 Introducing a local pattern may create nonlinearities. Specifically, if a particular portfolio of old
 instruments adds up to a new instrument subject to the local pattern, nonlinearity and inconsistency will
 result unless the sum of the tax treatments of the old instruments in the portfolio happens to be equal to
 the tax treatment that conforms to the local pattern. Avoiding inconsistency in this situation by ignoring
 the tax treatments of old instruments when they are combined to produce a new instrument amounts to
 an integration approach.
 The ABA Report on the tax treatment of contingent debt advocates an integration strategy as part of
 a local pattern approach. In particular, the Report calls for integrating the contingent portion of such
 debt and taxing that part as a unit under a set of generic (local pattern) rules rather than attempting to
 decompose it into component parts. See ABA Report, supra note 3, at 1189, 1195 (recommendations
 (13) & (15)-(20)). The stated rationale for this proposal is that bifurcation is a poor vehicle for achiev-
 ing consistency because there is no unique way to decompose the contingent portion of the debt. See id.
 at 1194-95. However, the Report is also skeptical about whether the integration approach itself could
 succeed in achieving consistency. See id. at 1195.
 78. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
 79. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
 80. More rigorously, a tax system is continuous if, for any position and any positive number (no
 matter how small), one can choose a range of portfolios surrounding the position such that the tax
 treatment of each portfolio in the range differs from the tax treatment of the position by less than the
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 Continuity is a stronger property than consistency. A tax system is consis-
 tent if a unique tax treatment exists for each cash flow pattern and if the law
 treats long and short versions of each position symmetrically.81 Continuity
 adds the requirement that the difference in tax treatment for any two positions
 must approach zero as the two positions converge.
 A policymaker who values consistency will value continuity for the same
 reasons.82 More importantly, the absence of continuity may vitiate many of the
 benefits of consistency. Consider, for example, a consistent but discontinuous
 system in which tax treatments change abruptly at a particular "jump" point.
 An investor could achieve "approximate" tax arbitrage by matching a long po-
 sition very close to the jump point with a short position exactly at that point.
 While the pretax net cash flow from these two positions can be made arbitrarily
 close to zero, the investor would experience a significant net tax effect.83 Thus,
 a system that is consistent but discontinuous fails to prevent tax manipulations
 similar to those possible in an inconsistent system.84
 As mentioned above, continuity implies consistency and therefore is a
 stronger requirement to impose on a tax system.85 However, continuity is a
 weaker requirement than linearity. Under fairly innocuous assumptions about
 the finiteness of taxes,86 it is a mathematical fact that linearity implies con-
 chosen number. For this statement to make sense mathematically, one must specify a norm for the
 vector space of positions and a norm for the vector space of tax outcomes. For example, if one chooses
 the Euclidean distance norm for both spaces, then for any two vectors x and y in N-dimensional space,
 Ix - yl, the norm of x - y, is the square root of the sum of the squared differences between the coordinates
 of x and y. Given a norm, the usual definition of continuity applies: An entire integration scheme 0 that
 maps from the space of portfolios to the space of tax outcomes is continuous if, for any position, p, and
 for any ? > 0, there is a 8 > 0 such that lp - p*I < 8 implies that 10(p) - 0(p*)l < F.
 81. See note 51 supra.
 82. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
 83. Suppose, for example, that the tax system is consistent but that a particular point exists where
 ordinary income treatment replaces capital gain treatment. Suppose also that portfolios near this point
 produce gains in most states of the world. One could set up a long position slightly on the capital gain
 side of the discontinuity and a short position slightly on the ordinary income side. By moving these
 positions closer and closer to the point of discontinuity, one could make the combined cash flow from
 the positions arbitrarily close to zero. At the same time, the tax treatments of the two positions will
 match capital gains on the long side against ordinary losses on the short side, thereby creating a net tax
 advantage (conversion of ordinary income to capital gain income) with virtually no net pretax cash flow.
 The tax advantage will not diminish as the positions move closer and closer together, so long as they
 remain on opposite sides of the discontinuity. The taxpayer will have achieved approximate tax arbi-
 trage. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra (illustrating "pure" tax arbitrage in a similar example
 where a taxpayer can reduce pretax cash flow to zero).
 84. Concern for continuity is evident in the tax policy literature. For example, the ABA Report on
 the treatment of contingent debt proposes to exclude instruments with de minimis contingent payments
 from the ambit of the contingent debt regulations. This measure would prevent issuers from being able
 to elect contingent debt treatment merely by including a nearly valueless contingent payment in the debt
 package. See ABA Report, supra note 3, at 1192. A continuous tax system would preclude such
 manipulations.
 85. Continuity requires that each portfolio map to a unique tax treatment. For a definition of
 continuity, see note 80 supra and accompanying text.
 86. The only assumption necessary is that the tax liability for any finite collection of assets will be
 finite. This assumption holds true if a finite minimal spanning set exists such that one unit of each asset
 in the set incurs a finite tax in every state of the world. The assumption is reasonable given that real
 world economies do not produce infinite returns.
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 tinuity.87 In contrast, functions can be continuous but not linear.88 Conse-
 quently, there are continuous and universal tax systems that cannot be
 generated by the spanning method. Because integration schemes (at least entire
 integration schemes) can generate these same tax systems, it is clear that inte-
 gration provides policymakers with a more general method for achieving desir-
 able tax results than any approach that reduces to the spanning method:
 The Integration Dominance Principle: Every continuous and universal tax sys-
 tem can be generated by an entire integration scheme. The spanning method,
 on the other hand, can only generate the subset of continuous and universal tax
 systems that also are linear.
 Because bifurcation methods tend to succeed only in linear tax systems, the
 Integration Dominance Principle validates the common intuition among practi-
 tioners that integration approaches have greater potential than bifurcation
 methods.89
 This greater potential has practical as well as theoretical significance. The
 current United States tax system has many nonlinearities. Only integration
 methods will achieve continuity or consistency in such a system. An example
 of a major nonlinearity in the current United States tax system is the asymmetry
 in the treatment of losses and gains. Suppose that a start-up company can do
 project A, project B, or both. Project A yields a $3000 profit or a $1000 loss
 with equal probability, while project B yields $1000 with certainty. If the com-
 pany does only project A and sustains a $1000 loss, the company cannot deduct
 the loss immediately but must carry the loss forward and use it against future
 gains. However, doing projects A and B simultaneously results in immediate
 use of the loss since the loss offsets the $1000 gain from project B.
 These loss carryforward rules result in a nonlinearity. To see why, suppose
 that a 40 percent tax rate applies to the company's projects and that the com-
 pany will do no projects other than A or B. The taxes arising from project A
 and B separately do not always add up to the tax arising from the projects when
 done together:
 87. This result will be familiar to readers with some background in real analysis. A linear trans-
 formation between vector spaces is continuous if it is "bounded," i.e., if all portfolios on the unit ball in
 the portfolio space have finite tax outcomes. Because all portfolios on the unit ball are weighted combi-
 nations of assets in some finite minimal spanning set, and because the tax system is linear, the finiteness
 of the tax vectors corresponding to the minimal spanning set assets guarantees continuity.
 88. For example, the function f(x) = xr, where x is a nonnegative real number and r is a positive
 real number other than zero or one, is continuous but not linear.
 89. See, e.g., Kau, supra note 3, at 1005-07 (arguing for integration because it avoids the com-
 plexities inherent in bifurcation); ABA Report, supra note 3, at 1195 (advocating integration over bifur-
 cation for the contingent part of debt).
This content downloaded from 131.215.225.150 on Mon, 28 Aug 2017 21:50:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 600 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:569
 TAXES FOR VARIOUS OUTCOMES AND PROJECT COMBINATIONS
 (GIVEN A $1000 GAIN FROM PROJECT B)
 $3000 Gain Outcome for $1000 Loss Outcome for
 Project A Project A
 Project A Alone $1200 $0
 Project B Alone $400 $400
 Projects A and B Together $1600 $0
 In the case where Project A yields a $1000 loss, the separate projects incur a
 sum of $400 in taxes, while doing the projects simultaneously results in zero
 tax liability.
 The treatment of losses under current law is effectively part of an integra-
 tion approach. That approach requires aggregating the income and deductions
 from all of a firm's projects and then applying a special tax rule if there is an
 aggregate loss. Because the ensuing tax system is nonlinear, the spanning
 method cannot generate the same result.
 Despite the greater promise of integration methods, these methods are not a
 panacea for the current United States tax system. Any revision aimed at mak-
 ing the system consistent and universal must eliminate existing direct inconsis-
 tencies, such as the ambiguous treatment of stocks and bonds.90 This task
 would require fundamental reform, whether accomplished with integration ap-
 proaches or otherwise.
 III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 A. An Overview of the Framework and its Application
 Part II developed a variety of results. This section provides an overview of
 the results and discusses how they apply to the challenges posed by new finan-
 cial products.
 Before beginning the overview, it is important to point out the wide appli-
 cability of bifurcation and integration techniques. Many areas of tax law that
 do not explicitly deal with new financial products employ or could employ
 these techniques. For example, Part II mentioned the integration aspects of the
 loss rules in current law. Another more general example of integration is the
 power of administrators and courts to apply the doctrine of "substance over
 form."9' This doctrine permits those enforcing the tax laws to overlook indi-
 vidual "pieces" of a transaction and tax the whole transaction according to its
 actual overall effect.92
 90. See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
 91. See BORIS I. BrrIKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
 GiFrs 1 4.3.3 (2d ed. 1989).
 92. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). In Knetsch, the taxpayer offset an invest-
 ment in annuities yielding 2.5% per year with debt carrying 3.5% annual interest. The 3.5% interest
 payments on the loans gave the taxpayer a current deduction, while the gain from the increased value of
 the annuities was both deferred and subject to favorable capital gains rates under the rules applicable at
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 Additional examples of bifurcation approaches in current law stem from the
 body of rules that apply to the sale of sole proprietorships and partnership inter-
 ests. In the case of a sole proprietorship, complete bifurcation determines the
 tax due upon sale. Rather than treat the business as an integrated entity, the tax
 system assigns a gain or loss, whether capital or ordinary, to each asset of the
 proprietorship as if the assets were sold individually.93 In contrast, the sale or
 liquidation of a partnership interest triggers a partial bifurcation approach.
 Gains upon sale of a partner's share in certain "hot" assets, principally appreci-
 ated inventory and accounts receivable, are taxed as ordinary income instead of
 capital gain,94 the same treatment that would apply to a direct sale of those
 assets. However, the class of hot assets does not include all assets that would
 produce ordinarily income or loss upon sale. As a result, the bifurcation is
 incomplete.95
 Since bifurcation and integration pervade current tax law, the results devel-
 oped in Part II concerning these approaches are useful outside the realm of new
 financial instruments. But there is also a deeper interrelationship. If current
 law uses flawed bifurcation or integration schemes, specific flaws can become
 focal points for tax-motivated financial creativity. It is the tax system's failure
 to be consistent, continuous, or linear that creates situations in which investors
 can "choose" tax treatments based on alternative transaction structures.
 It is worth summarizing the roles of the three principles, linearity, consis-
 tency, and continuity, with special emphasis on their implications for tax inno-
 vation. Linearity, the requirement that the sum of the taxes on the components
 of a portfolio add up to the tax on the whole portfolio under every possible
 decomposition, is the strongest of the three principles since it implies consis-
 tency and, under a reasonable finiteness assumption about taxes, continuity.96
 Continuity is the second strongest since it is an enhanced version of consis-
 tency. Continuity requires convergence of tax treatments as positions converge
 to a single portfolio, while consistency requires only that any single portfolio
 have a single specified tax treatment.97
 the time. Although the taxpayer incurred net negative pretax cash flows throughout the transaction, the
 substantial tax advantages made the whole transaction profitable.
 Using a substance over form approach, the Supreme Court denied the interest deduction for the
 borrowing. Id. at 366 ("[I]t is patent that there was nothing of substance to be realized by Knetsch from
 this transaction beyond a tax deduction."). The Court implicitly applied an integration approach by
 considering the nature of the transaction as a whole rather than allowing individual tax treatment of its
 parts to govern.
 93. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 91, ? 51.9. The seminal case establishing this rule is
 Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945) (ruling that a business' assets are taxed individually
 upon the sale of the business).
 94. I.R.C. ? 751(a) ( 1988).
 95. In addition, partners can structure liquidations, adjust inventory holdings prior to sale, or make
 other adjustments to avoid the operation of the rules. See 2 WILLIAM S. MCKEE, WILLIAM F. NELSON &
 ROBERT L. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, in 21.01-06 (2d ed.
 1990).
 96. See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
 97. See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra.
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 Bifurcation methods will succeed in general only if the tax system is lin-
 ear.98 The existence of significant nonlinearities in current law means that
 policymakers should be very cautious about trying to employ these methods.
 Practitioners quickly recognize opportunities to exploit nonlinearities when the
 tax law uses a bifurcation approach. Consider, for example, the bifurcation rule
 that applies to the sale of a partnership interest. The general rule is that sale or
 exchange of a partnership interest results in capital gain or capital loss.99 How-
 ever, partnership holdings are divided into categories, and for assets in certain
 categories gain on sale is characterized as ordinary gain.100 One of these cate-
 gories is "substantially appreciated inventory," which includes all of the part-
 nership's inventory if that inventory has appreciated by at least 20 percent (over
 its adjusted basis) and comprises more than 10 percent of the partnership's
 noncash assets.101 The rule does not consider assets held by the partners
 outside of the partnership. Thus, to benefit from the lower rate on capital gains,
 the partners can contribute some of their noncash assets, such as short-term
 Treasury bills, to the partnership in order to ensure that inventories are less than
 10 percent of the partnership's noncash assets.102 When the partnership is sold,
 the partners will receive cash in an amount equal to the assets that they have
 contributed, which they can reinvest in these assets. This set of maneuvers
 involves no actual change in the partners' portfolios, but reduces the partners'
 tax liability when the partnership interests are sold.
 New financial instruments, by providing new methods for dividing up cash
 flow patterns, increase investors' ability to exploit nonlinearities. As the inven-
 tion of new instruments becomes easier and less expensive, nonlinearities that
 coexist with bifurcation approaches in the tax code become a much more seri-
 ous problem. Indeed, as mentioned above, some of these nonlinearities may be
 focal points for financial innovation. In addition, using bifurcation to address
 problems that arise from new financial products may fail, or even create new
 problems, due to existing nonlinearities in the tax system.
 Unlike bifurcation, successful application of integration methods does not
 require linearity. With integration, however, continuity becomes a serious con-
 cern. If portfolios with nearly identical returns have widely divergent tax im-
 plications, a taxpayer can choose a radically different tax treatment by changing
 his portfolio slightly,103 or can engage in approximate tax arbitrage by simulta-
 neously holding a short position in one of the two portfolios and a nearly offset-
 ting long position in the other.104 An advanced financial engineering industry
 98. See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
 99. See I.R.C. ? 741 (1988).
 100. See id. ? 751(a).
 101. See id. ? 751(a), (d)(1).
 102. See MCKEE ET AL., supra note 95, 1 16.05 (noting that "noncash assets" under the 10% rule
 include short-term cash-like investments but not cash itself).
 103. One can extend the continuity concept by requiring that tax consequences not change "too
 quickly" with any particular portfolio shift. Continuity guarantees that no sudden jumps in tax treatment
 occur as investors vary the composition of their portfolios. However, continuous tax rules can come
 arbitrarily close to rules containing a discontinuity if the continuous rules involve increasingly drastic
 shifts in tax treatment near a given point in portfolio space.
 104. See note 83 supra for an example of approximate tax arbitrage.
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 that can produce new instruments at low cost exacerbates these problems by
 making finer gradations in portfolio choice possible.'05
 There are many familiar examples of discontinuities in current law. One
 need only look for boundaries that delineate abrupt changes in the aggregate tax
 treatment of an asset or transaction. The borderlines between capital and ordi-
 nary assets, between short- and long-term gains, and between passive and ac-
 tive income are major examples. Another is the substantially appreciated
 inventory test for partnership assets. A small change in a partnership's inven-
 tories or asset composition may determine whether gains on the inventories are
 ordinary or capital, and thus have significant tax consequences for the
 partners.106
 Discontinuities encourage tax-motivated financial innovation because new
 financial instruments enable investors to closely approach the borderlines be-
 tween tax treatments. A closer approach reduces the degree to which investors
 must alter the preferred pretax attributes of their portfolios in order to achieve
 desirable tax outcomes. Thus, when policymakers consider integration
 schemes, they must consider how these schemes exacerbate or alleviate the
 problems caused by discontinuities.
 The serious administrative costs of discontinuities and nonlinearities are ap-
 parent from history. These flaws induce major struggles between taxpayers and
 the government, often accompanied by new legislation attempting to curtail
 abuse. For example, the distinction between capital and ordinary assets, the
 distinction between short- and long-term gains, and the substantially appreci-
 ated inventory rule have each resulted in massive ongoing administrative
 problems. 107
 105. Nearly offsetting short and long positions do not always indicate tax manipulation. These
 positions may signify attempts to hedge business risk where only approximate hedging is available at an
 acceptable cost. For example, a company that has issued bonds with a payment at maturity that depends
 on the price of 3-month Treasury bills at that time might wish to hedge these bonds with Treasury bill
 futures. Because the most heavily traded Treasury bill futures contracts have standard expiration dates
 in March, June, September, and December, see DARRELL DuFFE, FUTURES MARKETS 346, 350 & 353
 (1989), there will be an imperfect match between the publicly traded Treasury bill futures and the
 Treasury bill price risk inherent in the company's bonds if the bonds mature in some other month.
 Contracting privately for a Treasury bill futures contract with precisely the right expiration date might
 be so costly that the company's best strategy is to settle for an imperfect hedge. Hedging business risks
 can serve socially valuable purposes. See note 109 infra.
 106. The substantially appreciated inventory test causes a discontinuity by establishing an arbi-
 trary point at which the treatment of an aggregate of assets, in this case inventories, abruptly changes.
 Given this discontinuity, it is not surprising that the test also results in a nonlinearity. See text accompa-
 nying notes 85-88 supra (showing that linearity implies consistency, so that a discontinuous tax system
 cannot be linear).
 107. See, e.g., BrrTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 91, IN 51, 53 (providing an overview of rules
 defining capital assets and holding period rules); STEPHEN A. LIND, STEPHEN SCHWARZ, DANIEL J.
 LATHROPE & JOSHUA D. ROSENBERG, FUNDAMENTALS OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 243-44 (3d ed. 1992)
 (discussing the elimination by statute of the second-tier partnership strategy for exploiting the substan-
 tially appreciated inventory rules); 2 McKEE ET AL., supra note 95, 1 16.04[2] (listing opportunities for
 manipulation under the substantially appreciated inventory rule and discussing potential government
 responses).
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 B. Tax Policy Implications
 If current trends are any indication, the variety and heterogeneity of avail-
 able financial products will continue to increase rapidly.108 Such growth
 threatens to create greater and more frequent problems for a tax system already
 riddled with inconsistencies and discontinuities. Hence, two profound chal-
 lenges face those who create, administer, and interpret the tax code: First, how
 can Congress shape the tax code in directions conducive to a "good" tax sys-
 tem? Second, how should administrators and courts respond to the dynamic tax
 environment created by financial innovation given that they cannot alter the
 major choices made by Congress?
 This article provides a theoretical structure useful for the debate about these
 questions. One can achieve consistency and universality by constructing a tax
 system with a single global pattern of taxation, such as cash flow taxation or
 accretion taxation. But this extreme degree of homogeneity is not necessary.
 A linear tax system relying on the spanning method can harbor radically differ-
 ent treatments for different financial instruments while still being consistent
 and universal. Even linearity is not required. Powerful and general approaches
 relying on integration methods can operate in a nonlinear environment. In fact,
 any consistent and universal set of rules is equivalent to an integration ap-
 proach. However, an integration scheme must be continuous, rather than
 merely consistent, or manipulation through approximate tax arbitrage and other
 devices will be possible.
 The current United States tax system contains not only nonlinearities and
 discontinuities but also direct inconsistencies. For example, the tax treatment
 of equity and debt differ substantially, but there is considerable overlap in these
 categories. As a result, to a significant extent, financial engineers can package
 the same set of cash flows to be equity or debt for tax purposes.
 Repairing the major discontinuities and inconsistencies in current law is a
 task that would require fundamental reform. These discontinuities and incon-
 sistencies arise from aspects of current law that are central to the statutory
 scheme, such as the debt/equity distinction, the distinction between capital as-
 sets and ordinary assets, and the differential treatment of gains and losses by
 holding period. Changing these fundamental aspects is only possible at the
 legislative level. Addressing major inconsistencies and discontinuities at that
 level would go a long way toward relieving the pressure arising from financial
 innovation since these flaws in the tax system tend to act as focal points that
 stimulate the development of tax-motivated new financial products. In addi-
 tion, if administrators must take these inconsistencies and discontinuities as
 given and immutable, not even the most powerful integration techniques will
 succeed at making the tax system consistent or continuous.
 Even if Congress implements major changes, it is likely that some signifi-
 cant inconsistencies and discontinuities will remain. This fact, and the darker
 possibility that no major reform will occur, create difficult choices for the
 108. See note 1 supra.
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 Treasury Department and the courts. Since no set of Treasury Regulations or
 cases can guarantee universality and consistency or continuity in the face of
 major inconsistencies and discontinuities, these authorities are necessarily lim-
 ited to prescribing second best solutions. Perhaps the only viable alternative
 for dealing with new financial instruments is the traditional one of analyzing
 the normative stakes for each type of transaction and then crafting a detailed
 response.109 Since the stakes differ by type of transaction, comprehensive rules
 are not always desirable.110 Loose ends in the form of inconsistencies, discon-
 tinuities, or lack of universality will be inevitable.
 109. Commentaries on the tax treatment of contingent debt provide a good example of this type of
 analysis. Issuers of contingent debt often hedge the contingencies by purchasing or issuing other finan-
 cial instruments. This hedging allows the issuer to shift the risk on the contingent portion of the debt to
 others, thereby facilitating a transaction (issuance of contingent debt) that can reduce the issuer's bor-
 rowing costs while simultaneously making capital markets more efficient by providing investors with
 an instrument they want. See Kleinbard, supra note 3, at 954. To ensure that asymmetric tax treatment
 of the hedge position and the contingent debt will not discourage such transactions, several commenta-
 tors have advocated integrating the two and treating the entire package as ordinary debt. See, e.g., id. at
 953; ABA Report, supra note 3, at 1199-1200.
 Not all corporate hedging transactions are socially valuable or good for shareholders. See Hu,
 Shareholder Welfare, supra note 2, at 1306-09 (noting that hedging by public corporations can be waste-
 ful when it is costly but merely eliminates risk that shareholders can avoid by holding diversified portfo-
 lios). But business hedging can serve socially valuable purposes, for example, when investors cannot
 distinguish poor business performance due to market fluctuations from poor performance due to bad
 management. By hedging business profits, managers can eliminate the market fluctuation effect and
 thus provide clearer information to these investors. The tax system should not discourage financial
 innovation that permits socially valuable hedging. However, the private and social costs of any particu-
 lar financial innovation may be quite subtle. See Hu, supra note 1, at 1462-63, 1465-67, 1465 n.31; see
 also Hu, Regulatory Paradigm, supra note 2, at 338-42 (noting the increasing complexity of new finan-
 cial products and their social costs). As a result, choosing the best tax treatment for financial innovation
 raises difficult issues pertaining to capital markets. Policymakers cannot always tell a priori which
 financial innovations are worth encouraging and which are not. In addition, it is not clear whether the
 tax laws are the appropriate vehicle by which to impose a subsidy or a burden.
 The picture becomes more complicated in light of the rich set of tax motivations for hedging. A
 firm may hedge to reduce fluctuations in taxable income and thereby reduce the possibility of a delay,
 due to the loss carryforward rules, in its tax deduction for current losses. Hedging also allows a firm to
 borrow more. The tax code arguably discriminates against firms with low borrowing capacity, see
 Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduction Discourages Innovation
 and Risk-Taking, 39 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming March 1994), and crafting tax rules that favor hedging
 (or at least do not hinder it) may correct this discrimination. Clearly, these considerations suggest a
 whole host of second best tax policy issues. The policymaker's attitudes toward the corporate interest
 deduction, the treatment of losses, and even corporate tax integration are relevant.
 110. For example, applying differing treatments to new instruments connected with different types
 of hedging transactions may be optimal. See note 109 supra. In any event, the accumulation of regula-
 tions, each responding to particular instruments or special problems, may be unavoidable. Proposals
 that call for common law development or a continuing dialogue among the Treasury, practitioners, and
 taxpayers are not necessarily a cop out. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. The gradualist
 theme in these proposals echoes Professor Henry Hu's more elaborate and general argument for an
 incremental, process-based approach to the regulation of new financial products. See Hu, supra note 1,
 at 1496; Hu, Regulatory Paradigm, supra note 2, at 413-14. Professor Hu stresses the informational
 disadvantages faced by regulators who must integrate new financial products into regulatory structures
 developed in response to existing financial instruments. Hu, supra note 1, at 1463, 1495-1508; Hu,
 Regulatory Paradigm, supra note 2, at 405-12. Although Professor Hu deals primarily with financial
 regulations, such as the capital adequacy rules that apply to banks, many of his arguments have obvious
 parallels for the design and administration of the tax laws in the face of financial innovation.
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